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I. Background
A. ROLE OF DisPuTE SETTLEMENT IN A CHANGING WORLD
Despite the commitment of nations to "settle their disputes by peaceful
means,"' the drastic and ultimate dispute-settlement method of war has been used
once again to resolve an international dispute-this time in the Middle East. One
might hope that the hell of war, and the destruction it inflicts upon innocent
populations and humanity generally, would have eliminated it as a viable instru-
ment for resolving international disputes at this advanced stage of world history.
Yet even with mankind's vast experience with war's horrors and waste, the world
community has been unable to channel all international disputes into peaceful
resolution processes. Because of the concept of sovereignty and the role that states
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play in the international system, states may give or withhold their consent to the
jurisdiction of third-party dispute-settlement regimes or the submission of their
interstate conflicts to the variety of intermediary dispute-settlement procedures.2
Thus, when a state resists in giving its consent, a dispute may either with time
go away, fester and possibly escalate, or become the subject and justification for
the use of coercive measures by the complainant-state, which, in many cases,
would be considered violations of international law.3 This latter prospect moti-
vates the construction of available and accessible processes and fora for preserving
state resort to peaceful dispute-resolution. The thaw in the Cold War environment
that dominated international relations for the past forty years and the emergence
of democratic regimes in many regions of the world offer additional opportunity
for building institutions that can serve the evolving new world order-an order
that will place greater emphasis on peaceful processes for resolving conflicts. In
the search for and development of these processes, existing institutions and their
experience with resolving international disputes should be taken into account.
B. THE MISSION OF THE WORLD COURT
Of all the post-Second World War institutions symbolizing the willingness of
nations to settle their differences peacefully, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ or World Court) is one of the most prominent. 4 The concept of nations
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1. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, para. 1, 2, para. 3, 33, para. 1, 95; see also U.N. CHARTER, arts.
10, 11, 12, 14, 52, para. 2, 99.
2. E.g., negotiation, good offices, mediation, fact-finding, conciliation, or other form of third-
party intervention aimed at assisting the parties to find an acceptable solution.
3. See J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 103-07, 519-25 (10th ed.
1989) (the author identifies the coercive measures as: retorsion, reprisal, pacific blockade, interven-
tion, and war).
4. The U.N. Charter established The International Court of Justice, (ICJ), which sits in The
Hague, Netherlands, as one of its principal organs, and the Court functions pursuant to the Statute
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resolving their differences by submitting them to a jury of jurists from different
legal and political systems is powerful indeed. Yet the destiny of global peace-
maker prescribed for the Court by its early advocates has never been achieved in
its almost half-century existence. The Court, at one time or another, has been
maligned for its partiality, 5 ignored, 6 and defied.
7 Its successes are noteworthy, 8
but they have not instilled sufficient state confidence in the institution to place it
at the center of available institutions employed to resolve international disputes
peacefully. The Court is in need of a revival, by both greater state use and reform.
9
of the ICJ. See U.N. CHARTER art. 92. The predecessor international judicial institution of the ICJ
was the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCU), which a Protocol of the League of Nations
established and operated pursuant to the PCIJ Statute. Id.
5. See generally Gordon, Observations on the Independence and Impartiality of the Members
of the International Court of Justice, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 397 (1987); Weiss, Judicial Independence
and Impartiality: A Preliminary Inquiry, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JusTICE AT A CROSSROADS
123 (L. Damrosch ed. 1987) [hereinafter CROSSROADS]; Lachs, A Few Thoughts on the Independence
of Judges in the International Court of Justice, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 593 (1987); T. FRANCK,
THE STRUCTRlE OF IMPARTIALITY (1968).
6. During the period 1970-80, the ICJ heard nine contentious and four advisory opinion suits.
The average number of cases per year since 1946 is 1.8 (1.2 contentious and 0.4 advisory). 1988-
1989 I.C.J.Y.B. 3-6 (1989).
The statistics for the PCII are not much better. Shabtai Rosenne reports that:
tln the 18 years between 1922 and 1939, a total of 66 cases were brought before it. Thirty-eight were contentious
cases and 28 advisory cases. Of those, 12 were later settled out of Court. In the 54 cases left for decision the Court
delivered 27 advisory opinions (all at the request of the League Council) and 32 judgments (two cases were pending
when the Second World War silenced the Court).... This gives an average of nearly four cases filed per year...
S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 10 (1985) [hereinafter ICJ
LAW & PRACTICE].
7. See generally Scott & Crajko, Compulsory Jurisdiction and Defiance in the World Court: A
Comparison of the PClf and the ICJ, 16 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 377 (1988); Charney, Disputes
Implicating the Institutional Credibility of the Court: Problems of Non-Appearance, Non-
Participation, and Non-Performance, in CROSSROADS, supra note 5, at 288; See also J. ELKINO,
NON-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1984); H. THIRLWAY, NON-
APPEARANCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1985).
8. Even generous statements about the contributions of the Court acknowledge its limitations.
Rosenne, in 1985, wrote: "In fact, partly, but only partly, for reasons beyond its control, the new
Court has never been able to win for itself that degree of confidence which the Permanent Court was
able to attain after a few years. . . . It has not yet found its place in the reservoir of international
organs established to assist states to reach a peaceful settlement of their international legal disputes."
Rosenne, The Changing Role of the International Court, 20 ISRAEL L. REv. 182, 195, 204 (1985).
The assessment of the PCU is, perhaps, no kinder: The Court was conceived... as a great bulwark of peace and
popular support was enlisted for it on that basis. On the record of its eighteen years of useful service, however,
some doubt may be entertained with reference to the Court's fulfillment of such a role. Its jurisdiction was quite
limited, and in the cases which came before it for judgment the Court was called upon to decide juridical
differences which usually depended on the construction of treaty provisions too complicated to excite popular
agitation.... It would be difficult to say that any of these cases threatened to become a casus belli, though some
of them related to differences which, if the Court had not been available and if they had been allowed to fester,
might have led to serious complications. The Court's bolstering of the structure of peace was accomplished through
its advisory opinions, through the confidence which it inspired, and through the encouragement it gave to the
existence of the law of pacific settlement, rather than through its disposition of particular disputes.
M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, PAST AND FUTURE 238-39 (1944).
9. "The ICJ could potentially play a far greater role than it presently plays in developing and
applying international law. Its potential has not been realized, despite developments in international
law and adjudication that should have led states to rely more heavily on the Court." Sofaer, Adju-
dication in the International Court of Justice: Progress through Realism, 44 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y.
462, 484 (1989) [hereinafter Sofaer].
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For the United States, the nadir of this recent history was the Court's dispo-
sition of the Nicaragua v. United States case,' 0 during and after which the United
States questioned the Court's procedures, interpretations, and composition.1 1
During this episode, the United States also ended one of the longest continuous
acceptances of the World Court's compulsory jurisdiction under article 36(2) of
the ICJ Statute.12 Notwithstanding this withdrawal, the United States has since
continued to utilize the Court on a limited, voluntary basis;13 but it has been
resolute in its resistance to reconsider reacceptance of the optional clause or to
submit disputes to the full Court. 14
10. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J.
14 (Judgment of June 27). The official denomination of the case is "Military and Paramilitary
Activities In and Against Nicaragua," which arguably by its title prejudges the facts; in any case, it
marks a departure from the Court's normal process of labeling cases before it with more neutral
names. For example, Nicaragua's suit against Honduras, based on similar facts, was named "Border
and Transborder Armed Actions." See I.C.J. Communique No.86/14 (Oct. 24, 1986). Despite U.S.
objections to the name of Nicaragua's case against it, the name was not changed. 1986 I.C.J. at
320-21 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
11. The State Department's Legal Adviser, Abraham Sofaer, explained his views as follows:
The IC1 assumed jurisdiction over Nicaragua's claims, despite clear indications that the U.S. had not accepted the
Court's jurisdiction in such matters. The question addressed by the Court, moreover, was one which the Court
should have been especially anxious to avoid.... At a minimum, the Court should have avoided so fundamental
an issue in the absence of clear consent.... The law applied by the Court on the merits also came as a surprise.
The decision relied, not on actual custom and practice, but on rules that were seemingly derived for the purpose
of reducing resort to force, even at the cost of diminishing the right of self-defense, which in the absence of
Security Council action is the only reliable means for deterring aggression in the world today. And perhaps more
disturbing, the Court appeared to adopt new "rules of recognition," for the identification of new rules of
international law, thus undermining principles upon which customary international law has been based.
Sofaer, supra note 9, at 477 (footnotes omitted). See generally CROSSROADS, supra note 5.
12. The United States declared its acceptance on August 26, 1946, and modified it on April 6,
1984 (an attempt to exclude the Nicaragua litigation three days before that case was filed). On
October 8, 1985, the United States withdrew its article 36(2) declaration, effective six months later,
per the terms of the declaration. 1985-1986 I.C.J.Y.B. 60 (1986). U.S. Dep't of State, U.S.
Terminates Acceptance of the ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction, DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 1986, at 67
(statement of Oct. 9, 1985), [hereinafter Withdrawal Statement]. In its formal explanation, the
United States offered the following: The majority of other nations (most notably the Soviet Union and
its allies) had never accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction; the Court had been misused for
political reasons; and continued acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction was contrary to our commit-
ment to the principle of the equal application of the law and would endanger the United States' vital
national interests. For the text of article 36(2) of the Statute, see infra note 46.
13. The only case instigated by the United States since the Nicaragua case is Elettronica Sicula
S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1987 I.C.J. 3 (Order of Mar. 2-Constitution of Chamber), a case
submitted by special agreement to a Special Chamber of the IC1. A case brought against the United
States to be tried by the full Court is a Case Concerning Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.),
1989 I.C.J. 132 (filed May 17, 1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 842 (1989) [hereinafter Airbus
litigation]. The United States was the subject of an advisory opinion, Applicability of the Obligation
to Arbitrate under Sec. 21 of the U.N. Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, 1988 I.C.J. 12
(advisory opinion of Apr. 26, 1988) [hereinafter Headquarters Agreement case], and actively par-
ticipated in submitting briefs and argument in a second advisory opinion, Applicability of Art. VI,
sec. 22 of Convention of Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 1989 I.C.J. 177 (here-
inafter Diplomatic Immunities case].
14. However, in the recent Airbus litigation, supra note 13, the United States agreed to partic-
ipate in the ICJ proceedings before the full Court. Its first task, however, is to contest the jurisdiction
VOL. 25, NO. 3
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 679
After five years of this estrangement, then, the time has come to review the
U.S.-World Court relationship to determine whether reconciliation is possible, 1
5
and, perhaps more important, what role the Court should play in the United
States' future foreign policy initiatives. 16 Moreover, with geopolitical conditions
in flux, these are the times in which carefully crafted initiatives intended to build
institutions that can ensure a more secure and peaceful world may receive a
favorable audience nationally and internationally. 17 To advance this possibility,
this article briefly reviews the nature of international dispute settlement, espe-
cially the process of international adjudication, and more specifically, compul-
sory jurisdiction before the ICJ. However, the focus is on the possible U.S.
initiatives that, taken alone or in concert with others, would enhance the juris-
diction and institution of the Court. It also assesses those initiatives that, taken
outside the ICJ, might benefit or enlarge the prospects for the peaceful resolution
of international disputes.
of the ICJ. Unlike the Nicaragua case, the United States has suggested by its willingness to partic-
ipate in the Airbus litigation that it will continue to appear to argue the merits even if it loses at the
jurisdictional phase.
15. At best, one could describe the U.S. attitude toward the Court in the intervening years since
the Nicaragua case as ambivalent. While it has participated actively in several cases-namely,
Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (U.S. v. Italy), 1987 I.C.J. 3 (Order of Mar. 2-Constitution of Chamber)
(a Chambers case), two advisory opinion cases (the Headquarters Agreement case (see supra note 13)
and the Diplomatic Immunities case, (see supra note 13), and the Airbus litigation (see supra note
13) with Iran before the full Court-its initiatives with respect to the Court have been cautious. Given
the limits of the international adjudicative process and the inherent jurisdictional limits of an inter-
national tribunal, this essay counsels a realistic assessment of these limitations and prudent steps to
enhance and enlarge the Court's jurisdiction.
16. At the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association in August 1989, the ABA House
of Delegates reaffirmed a steadfast commitment to world order under law and to the policies and
objectives of earlier resolutions concerning U.S. acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice. It also approved support for U.S. pursuit of a new policy to negotiate agreements
with other states consenting to the jurisdiction of the Court. In Act of Feb. 16, 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-246, § 41 l(a)-(b), 104 Stat. 15, Congress also endorsed the U.S. negotiation of agreements
consenting to the jurisdiction of the Court.
17. E.g., the United Nations General Assembly recently declared the U.N. Decade of
International Law. Among the main purposes of this decade are: "to promote means and methods
for the peaceful settlement of disputes between states, including resort to and full respect for the
International Court of Justice. ... U.N. Doc. A/44/191 (1989). The American Bar Association
also endorsed agreements between the United States and other countries which consent to the
jurisdiction of the ICJ. Delegates Approve Wide Range of Issues, ABA WAsH. LErrER, Sept. 1,
1989, at 5.
A possible renewed interest in article 36(2) may spawn a reconsideration of whether to declare
acceptance or not. Recently, several third-world states have accepted article 36(2) jurisdiction of the
ICJ (Zaire, Nauru, and Guinea Bissau-the latter two in order to bring lawsuits against states
already declaring their acceptance), and Spain and Poland have indicated their intention to accept
article 36(2) jurisdiction. Three East Bloc countries (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the German
Democratic Republic as it then existed) have already withdrawn reservations to ICJ clauses in
certain multilateral treaties or have indicated their intention to do so.
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H. Third-Party Dispute-Settlement and the World Court
A. GENERAL
Neither the forum nor the form of process for resolving disputes between states
is dictated by international law. ' 8 Adjudication of international disputes is but
one of a variety of processes available to states. It involves the reference of a
dispute by agreement or consent of the parties to a standing or permanent judicial
body for a binding or advisory decision on the basis of international law. 19
However, depending on the nature of the dispute, the states' interests involved,
and the outcomes sought by settlement, other methods may well meet the needs
of states and the international system.2 °
Adjudication became the process of choice of the ICJ for various political and
historical reasons. The ICJ, the successor to the Permanent Court of International
Justice (PCIJ) 21 of the failed League of Nations, is in most respects a continu-
ation of the earlier institution. The ICJ adopted with little change the prior
Court's constitution, its relationship to the parent international organization, the
extent of its jurisdiction, and the procedure prescribed under its Statute. 22 The
same reasons that inspired the formation of the PCIJ in 1920,23 together with the
18. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 902
reporter's notes at 3 [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. Although the United Nations Charter
specifies the establishment of the International Court of Justice as a principal organ, it only requires
states to "settle their disputes by peaceful means" and indicates a broad range of dispute resolution
processes that among others should be considered, including "negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement .. " U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3, art. 33, para. 1.
Only when a dispute involves the Security Council, or when the Security Council, General Assembly,
other U.N. organs, or specialized agency, seeks an advisory opinion on a legal question, is the ICJ
specified as the appropriate forum.
19. See Bilder, An Overview of International Dispute Settlement, 1 J. INT'L DISPUTE RESOL. 1,
25 (1986) [hreinafter Bilder, Overview]; Bilder, in CROSSROADS, supra note 5, at 155; and ABA
Standing Comm. on World Order Under Law, Draft General Treaty on the Peaceful Settlement of
International Disputes: A Proposal and Report, 20 INT'L LAW. 261, 281-82 (1986) [hereinafter Draft
General Treaty].
20. "[Ifn practice, most international disputes-including legal disputes-are resolved by non-
adjudicatory rather than adjudicatory techniques." Bilder, CROSSROADS, supra note 5, at 155, 162.
21. The establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice was prescribed by article 14
of the Covenant of the League of Nations. A separate Statute of the PCIJ was drafted to be ratified
by Members of the League, and it was in September 1921 that the Statute entered into force on
ratification by a majority of the League Members. "[T]he Permanent Court of International Justice
was the first truly international tribunal, much more representative of the community of states and of
the major legal systems of the world than any institution that may have preceded it." N. SINGH, THE
ROLE AND RECORD OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 9 (1989).
22. Gilmore, The International Court of Justice, 55 YALE L. J. 1049 (1946); Report of the
Informal Inter-Allied Committee on the Future of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 39
AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp.) 1 (1945); Hudson, The Twenty-Fourth Year of the World Court, 40 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1946) [hereinafter The Twenty-Fourth Year.]
23. See M. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 1920-1942 (1943); M.
DUNNE, THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT, 1920-1935 (1988).
VOL. 25, NO. 3
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 681
high approval rating given the record of the PCIJ, influenced the founding and
structure of the ICJ.
24
Because of the strong international arbitration tradition which preceded the
founding of the PCU, 25 that Court and its successor, the ICJ, adopted an ap-
proach to adjudication quite similar to arbitration. The ICJ provides a permanent
forum with permanent personnel for resolving international disputes between
states, if they agree to submit their particular dispute to it or if they had previ-
ously agreed to accept the Court's jurisdiction over a category of disputes that
includes the particular dispute. However, unlike interstate arbitration, the ICJ
form of adjudication does not enable states to choose the judges, the procedure,
or the law to be applied.2 6 And, in the sense that municipal law provides for
compulsory jurisdiction by its courts, the ICJ does not possess all the attributes
one generally associates with a mandatory adjudication regime; states normally
do not consent to the jurisdiction of the Court for all controversies between
states, and the Court itself has no competence over states that have not conferred
it jurisdiction.
B. THE ICJ AND INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION TODAY
Notwithstanding these possible shortcomings and the reality that other fora
and processes exist for settling interstate disputes, 27 the availability of adjudi-
cation before the ICJ is an important and desired form of international dispute
resolution for states. The provision of a permanent, preconstituted institution
before which parties submitting disputes are limited in their ability to debate
technical procedural matters28 that may have strong political undertones, signif-
24. See supra note 8; The Twenty-Fourth Year, supra note 22, at 7-8; see also Gilmore, supra
note 22, at 1050-51.
25. See M. DUNNE, supra note 23, ch. 1.
26. RESTATEMENT (THLRD), supra note 18, at part IX (introductory note).
27. "Most disputes involving a claim of violation of international law are resolved by negoti-
ation. The general expectation of states that legal obligations will be observed tends to promote such
resolution. If negotiations do not result in a settlement, there may be resort to a third party for
assistance, an advisory opinion or binding decision." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 18, at part
IX, (introductory note). See also U.N. CHARTER art. 33; Charter of the Organization of American
States art. 21, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 139 U.N.T.S. 3; European
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes arts. 1-3, Apr. 29, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 243; Pact
of the League of Arab States, art. 19, Mar. 22, 1945, 70 U.N.T.S. 237; and Charter of the Islamic
Conference, art ii(a), para. 4, adopted Mar. 4, 1972, 914 U.N.T.S. 103.
28. "Factors such as the choice of the judges, their agreement to act, the law they are to apply,
the procedure to be followed, the competence of the Court both as regards the merits and as regards
all pre-judicial and other incidental questions, are all carefully regulated in the constitutional texts,
and either states cannot derogate from them at all, or they can only do so with the consent of the
Court, and under its control." ICJ LAW AND PRAC'nCE, supra note 6, at 8. Elsewhere, Rosenne has
referred to these matters over which the ICJ maintains control as "procedural absolutes." Rosenne,
Reflections on International Arbitration and Litigation in the International Court of Justice, FORUM
INTERNATIONALE, Feb. 1987, at 13-16.
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icantly depoliticizes the pretrial aspects of controversies and makes resort to a
resolution process politically more acceptable at home.
29
The ICJ, as a permanent court, can be a convenient recourse for parties to a
dispute because the tribunal is already constituted and prepared to undertake the
adjudication process.30 This ready availability further reminds disputing nations that
an institution capable of handling their disputes exists, and, depending on its acces-
sibility, makes it difficult to resist a party's invitation to resolve the dispute through
such an institution's intervention. 3' Although there has been some difference of
opinion,32 the ICJ potentially offers litigants the prospect of an independent and
professional forum. Finally, the existence of the ICJ makes possible the consistent
development and clarification of international law. It provides more than a symbol
of the role of law through the peaceful resolution of interstate disputes-it is a
concrete expression for the world community of the reality of international law. 34
1. The Meaning of Compulsory Jurisdiction
The acceptance by states of the compulsory jurisdiction of PCIJ was hoped for
over time as states would recognize the competency of the Court and the value
of resolving their disputes before it. However, given the nature of the interna-
tional system, which relies upon the consent of states, 35 there was little prospect
29. See ICJ LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 6, at 8, 421.
30. See Rosenne, ICJ, in CROSSROADS, supra note 5, at 173.
31. Id. at 174; see also Allott, The International Court of Justice, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES:
THE LEGAL ASPECTS 129-31 (H. Walcock ed. 1972) (report of a Study Group at David Davies
Memorial Institute).
32. See Weiss, supra note 5, at 123.
33. See Bilder, Overview, supra note 19, at 174; H. LAUTERpAC T, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1982); Sohn, The Future of International
Dispute Settlement, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY, DOCRINES AND THEORY 1121 (R. MacDonald & D. Johnson eds. 1983).
34. Bilder, in CROSSROADS, supra note 5, at 174.
35. The effective functioning of an international adjudicative process depends on the authority
it is conferred by states to define its own jurisdiction and the way it in fact does so. The process by
which this jurisdiction is conferred and defined is one involving inherently political factors. Placing
adjudication of disputes outside the realm of municipal courts creates the prospects for clashes of
varying interpretations of national interests when the international tribunal presses the definition of
its jurisdiction beyond what is authorized by the involved states. See generally Romaine, The
National Interest and the World Court, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 313
(L. Gross ed. 1976) [hereinafter FUTURE OF ICJ]; Scott & Carr, The I.C.J. and Compulsory Juris-
diction: The Case for Closing the Clause, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 72-74 (1987); H. BERGMAN, LAW
AND REVOLUTION (1983); Falk, The Relevance of Political Context to the Nature and Functioning of
International Law: An Intermediate View, in THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 177, 195 (K.
Deutsch & S. Hoffmann ed. 1971).
De Visscher wrote about adjudicative jurisdiction and state sovereignty with respect to the World
Court:
From its very beginning, the Court has understood that in the application of the law, as in the establishment of its
own powers, sovereignty would be the center and symbol of resistance, the critical element that it must try to
contain without provoking dangerous reactions, to respect without subordinating to it the law of which the Court
is the guardian.
C. DE VISSCHER, THE THEORY AND REALITY OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 392 (1968).
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in 1920 or 1946 of imposing upon states the kind of jurisdiction enjoyed in
municipal legal systems, which have compulsory jurisdiction over persons and
activities within their competence. 36 The objective of creating a type of com-
pulsory jurisdiction to which all states would consent by becoming members of
the United Nations was nevertheless discussed during the formative period of the
ICJ; but it was resisted successfully by several of the Great Powers.37 The
outcome of this effort was that the United Nations established the ICJ with
essentially the same jurisdictional competence as the PCIJ had: advisory, in
response to requests made by various entities of the United Nations; and con-
tentious, that is, jurisdiction over the disputes of states conferred it by their
express or implied consent.
2. The Contentious Jurisdiction of the World
Court: Its Relationship to Compulsory Jurisdiction
The bulk of cases before the ICJ has involved its contentious jurisdiction. 38
The Court's jurisdiction is founded upon several sources. Under article 93 of the
U.N. Charter, all members of the United Nations are parties to the Statute of the
ICJ, 39 which constitutes the governing instrument of the ICJ. 40 As the principal
judicial organ of the United Nations, the ICJ and its Statute form an integral part
of the U.N. Charter.41 Thus, the Statute defines the essential bases of ICJ
jurisdiction, even though the Charter may also play a role.42
36. The tendency to equate international adjudicative jurisdiction as possessed by the ICJ with
the nature of jurisdiction possessed by courts in municipal legal systems is understandable, but
inapposite. The initiative for a typical contentious civil proceeding before a municipal court lies
with the claimant, for which free access to the forum and jurisdiction over the defendant often
automatically exist. In short, the defendant is compulsorily subject to the jurisdiction of the
municipal court.
In international judicial jurisdiction, however, this sort of automatic jurisdiction over disputes
and parties existing domestically may not be present. Thus, there are substantial gaps between a
truly compulsory form of international jurisdiction as described by Hans Kelsen and the forms
provided by the ICJ. See Kelsen, Compulsory Adjudication of International Disputes, 37 AM. J.
INT'L L. 397 (1943).
37. See Kelly, The International Court of Justice: Crisis and Reformation, 12 YALE J. INT'L L.
342, 346 (1987).
38. As of 1988 there have been fifty-seven contentious cases before the Court and twenty
advisory opinions. 1987-1988 I.C.J.Y.B. 3-4 (1988).
39. A state that is not a member of the U.N. may also be a party to the Statute. See U.N.
CHARTER art. 93, para. 2. Liechtenstein, Nauru, San Marino, and Switzerland are currently non-
members under this category. See 1987-88 I.C.J.Y.B. 49 (1988).
40. While the Statute can be amended, the process for doing so does not suggest it can be done
easily. Article 69 of the Statute provides that amendment of the Statute is effected by the same
method used to amend the U.N. CHARTER under articles 108-109. Under article 70 of the Statute,
the Court has the power to propose amendments and forward them to the U.N. Secretary-General,
after which the U.N. amendment process takes over. The Court has yet to avail itself of this power.
See ICJ LAW & PIRAcncE, supra note 6, at 57-58.
41. U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
42. This interrelationship of the Charter and Statute may arise with respect to objections by the
respondent to the jurisdiction, admissibility, and even justiciability of the Court. This relationship is
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a. Jurisdiction Under Article 36(1)
By being a party to the Statute a state does not automatically grant jurisdiction
to the Court, but rather consents to the functioning of the Court pursuant to the
Statute. Before the Court may acquire jurisdiction with respect to any party, it
must have the consent of that party in one form or another. Under the Statute, this
consent may be obtained in several ways. Three bases for jurisdiction are found
in article 36(1) of the Statute:
(1) parties may have entered into an agreement with another disputant to
refer a particular dispute to the Court after it has arisen;
43
(2) parties may have entered into a bilateral or multilateral agreement in
which they stipulated that disputes between them as to the agreement are to be
referred to the Court;44 or
(3) states may be party to a general treaty on dispute settlement which
provides that disputes arising between or among them will be subject to certain
procedures, specifically or including submission to the ICJ.
45
b. Jurisdiction Under Article 36(2)
Known variously as the "unilateral declaration clause," the "compulsory ju-
risdiction clause," the "obligatory jurisdiction clause," or the "optional clause,"
article 36(2) provides another jurisdictional basis by which parties can initiate
also manifested in the power of the Security Council to refer the resolution of disputes to regional
tribunals (U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 3), or by the ability of the General Assembly or Security
Council to request advisory opinions (U.N. CHARTER art. 96, para. 1). Other organs of the United
Nations or its specialized agencies, when authorized by the General Assembly, may also request
advisory opinions of the Court. U.N. CHARTER art. 96, para. 2. See generally I. SHIHATA, THE POWER
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT TO DETERMINE ITS OWN JURISDICTION 118-25 (1965); N. SINGH, supra
note 21, at 37-82.
43. This type of jurisdiction is often referred to as ad hoc jurisdiction by special agreement
(compromis).
44. Such clauses are referred to as "compromissory." The United States is a party to approx-
imately seventy-five such treaties. See Morrison, Treaties as a Source of Jurisdiction, Especially in
U.S. Practice, in CROSSROADS, supra note 5, at 58 (citing seventy treaties). See 1987-1988
I.C.J.Y.B. 98-114 (1988) for a chronological list of treaties and other instruments which contain
clauses relating to the jurisdiction of the Court in contentious proceedings.
These arrangements subject parties to a kind of "compulsory jurisdiction" during the effectiveness
of the prescribed agreement. As will be seen, it is slightly confusing to employ the term "compulsory
jurisdiction" when discussing article 36(2) of the U.N. Charter, which popularly, though inaccu-
rately, has also been referred to as compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.
45. E.g., the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1928, as revised
in 1949. See generally Brierly, The General Act of Geneva 1928, 11 BRr. Y.B. INT'L L. 119 (1930).
For other such general treaties, see the Charter of the Organization of American States [Pact of
Bogota], Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3; and the European Con-
vention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes of 1957, Apr. 29, 1957 Europ. T.S. No. 23. See also
Draft General Treaty, supra note 19; W. JENKS, THE PROSPECrS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
13-18, 24-26 (1964). Such arrangements subject parties to a "compulsory jurisdiction" during the
effectiveness of the particular agreement involved, in that they prescribe the process by and forum
in which settlement of a dispute will take place.
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litigation before the ICJ.46 Under the system prescribed by article 36(2), accep-
tance of jurisdiction is by the method of unilateral declaration, deposited pursuant
to article 36(4) with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In accordance
with article 36(5) of the Statute,4 7 declarations made under the PCIJ are deemed
to be acceptances under the ICJ Statute. The terms contained in the unilateral
acceptance by a state binds that declarant vis-A-vis any other declarant state to the
extent that the acceptances coincide. 48 Article 36(3) 49 provides an additional
reciprocity safeguard and indicates that time limits may be placed on acceptan-
ces. 50 Last, applying to the optional clause as well as article 36(1), article 36(6)
specifies that the Court determines whether it has jurisdiction.
3. Evaluation of ICJ Jurisdictional Bases
By a variety of evaluation standards, article 36(2) jurisdiction of the ICJ has
not achieved the goals set for it by its founders, nor has the United States, an
early proponent and forty-year adherent to the optional clause, been a beneficiary
of this approach. 5 ' International adjudication before the ICJ does not have to rest
on article 36(2) jurisdiction. Compromissory clauses in treaties and general
treaties regarding dispute settlement that refer disputes to the ICJ provide an
alternative approach to building a basis for compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
46. I.C.J. Statute art. 36, para. 2 provides:
The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and
without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court
in all legal disputes concerning:
(a) the interpretation of a treaty;
(b) any question of international law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.
47. Since the U.S. Government maintained that such a declaration was not a treaty, it did not
require the two-thirds advice and consent of the Senate. See S. REP. No. 1835, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.,
92 CONG. REc. 10, 706-08 (1946). Professor Brownlie points out that "declarations are valid
without ratification." I. BROWNLfE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 723 n.3 (3d ed. 1979).
Nevertheless, he adds, they may be subject to ratification, and are registered as international agree-
ments under U.N. CHARTER art. 102. Id. The Senate, however, in its 1946 consideration of the
declaration accepting article 36(2) jurisdiction of the ICJ did treat the matter as a treaty. See Glennon,
Nicaragua v. United States: Constitutionality of U.S. Modification of I.C.J. Jurisdiction, 79 AM. J.
INT'L L. 682 (1985); Glennon, Constitutional Issues in Terminating U.S. Acceptance of Compulsory
Jurisdiction, in CROsSROADS, supra note 5, at 447. Consequently, withdrawal or modification of such
a declaration raises constitutional questions. See also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 966 (1979).
In the recent case of Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), 1988 I.C.J.
69, 84, 124 (Dec. 20), the ICJ entertains the possibility that states may multilaterally accept article
36(2) jurisdiction via a general dispute settlement treaty, although this has generally been considered
to be an article 36(1) approach.
48. I.C.J. Statute art. 36, para. 5.
49. This reciprocity requirement is derived from the preambular language of I.C.J. Statute art.
36, para. 2 (". . . in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation. ... ).
50. "The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on condition of reci-
procity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain time." I.C.J. Statute art. 36, para. 2.
51. See I. BROWNLIE, supra note 47, at 724-25.
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under article 36(1) of the Statute. Even the advisory opinion jurisdiction of the
Court arguably offers a kind of compulsory jurisdiction of disputes, although
states themselves are not technically before the Court or subjected to its juris-
diction. 52 While there has always been legitimate argument about whether ad-
judication is the appropriate means of settling the variety of international disputes
that arise in the world system,53 and whether a larger regime of compulsory
jurisdiction to adjudicate such disputes is a goal sought by states, 54 the search for
a greater and more effective role of the ICJ requires looking beyond the ideal of
compulsory jurisdiction once offered by article 36(2). 5
I. Revising the U.S. Approach and Reforming the Court
While acceptance and use of compulsory jurisdiction under the optional clause
has not reflected a groundswell of interest and activity in the World Court,
neither have the forms of "compulsory" jurisdiction provided under article 36(1)
by compromissory clause or general dispute-settlement treaty resulted in a flurry
of activity before the Court. 56 On the other hand, these latter forms have the
virtue of a greater consensual bond, making it less likely that parties will contest
jurisdiction or not appear before the Court in defiance of its jurisdiction.5 7
A. NEW APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES FOR
IMPROVING THE JURISDICTIONAL BASE
In the last few years the initial freeze in U.S.-ICJ relations felt in the immediate
aftermath of the Nicaragua case has thawed somewhat. The United States has
played an active role in the proceedings of the Court, albeit not under article 36(2)
jurisdiction. The United States has been involved as a plaintiff in a chambers
52. See Lutz, The World Court in a Changing World: An Agenda for Expanding the Court's Role
from a U.S. Perspective, STAN J. INT'L L. (1991), in which the author addresses the following
relevant topics in some detail: history of article 36(2) practice of states in declaring acceptance of
article 36(2); nature and scope of reservations made by states; litigation under article 36(2), specif-
ically with respect to ICJ findings of sufficient and insufficient jurisdiction; and the United States as
a litigant before the Court.
53. See, e.g., Bilder, Overview, supra note 19.
54. Noyes, Compulsory Third-Party Adjudication and the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L. 675, 676-87 (1989).
55. As long as the IC's constituency remains so limited, generalized submission to the Court's jurisdiction would
expose the United States or any other state to litigation in circumstances in which other principal actors in the
international arena do not accept the same ras.... To gain widespread acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction will
require abandonment, as an ideal, of the model by which states would submit generally to the Court's jurisdiction,
and then add reservations to prevent adjudication in certain areas or on certain issues. This approach has failed to
confer an adequate degree of assurance that the Court will interpret limitations or deal with justiciability issues in
the manner actually intended. A general submission to the Court's jurisdiction enables the Court potentially to nile
that it has jurisdiction over any issue.
Sofaer, supra note 9, at 478-79 (1989) (footnote omitted).
56. See Gross, Compulsory Jurisdiction Under the Optional Clause: History and Practice, in
CROSSROADS, supra note 5, at 45-46, 49-57.
57. See, e.g., Scott & Csajko, supra note 7.
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proceeding58 and is a defendant in another case, 59 both pursuant to treaty pro-
visions under article 36(1). The United States has also been involved in two recent
advisory decisions of the Court. In the first it was the object of the opinion, 60 and
in the second, it was the only state to file a brief, supporting the U.N. position,
with the Court. 61 Hence, although the U.S. attitude toward the Court remains
cautious, it appears the United States is willing to develop a limited jurisdictional
base that fits its needs and accomplishes settlement of international disputes.
1. General Criteria
In devising new U.S. approaches for enhancing the use of and, in turn, the
international jurisdiction of the World Court, several objectives ought to be
identified. First, a realistic appraisal of the role of international adjudication and
compulsory jurisdiction should shape the way in which the United States com-
mits itself to having its disputes resolved by the Court. In this regard, not all
international disputes require adjudication or need to be brought before the ICJ.
Other fora are being made available to the international community,6 2 and there
58. Elettronica Skula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20).
59. Airbus litigation, supra note 13.
60. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Head-
quarters Agreement of 26 June 1949, 1988 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 9).
61. Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities
of the United Nations, 1989 I.C.J. 177 (June 14).
62. E.g., the European Communities' Court of Justice, the dispute-settlement mechanisms of the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement's Binational Panels, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the European and Inter-American Courts of Human
Rights.
In 1990, efforts to create an international criminal court were revived by Congress, the ABA,
and the United Nations. In Act of Nov. 5, 1990 Pub. L. No. 101-513, § 599E(c), 104 Stat. 1979,
Congress called for the President to report to Congress by Oct. 1, 1991, its efforts to establish such
a court. Such a court would have jurisdiction over criminal acts defined by international
conventions, for example, war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, piracy and crimes aboard
commercial vessels, aircraft hijacking and sabotage of aircraft, crimes against diplomats and other
internationally protected persons, hostage-taking, and illicit drug cultivation and trafficking. See also
Resolution sponsored by Milwaukee Bar Association and ABA Section of International Law and
Practice, passed by the ABA House of Delegates, mid-year meeting 1991, ABA WASH. LETrER,
Feb. 1, 1991, at 4. At the U.N., Trinidad and Tobago, among others, have proposed the
establishment of an international criminal court to assist the fight against illicit drug trafficking. See
Establishment of International Criminal Court Urged at U.N., Xinhua General Overseas News
Service, Feb. 21, 1990. In the wake of the Iraqi war, this proposal, broadened in scope to include
other international criminal offenses such as war crimes, has taken on new life. See Elsner, U.S.
Looking at Options for Iraqi War Crimes Trial, Reuters, Jan. 22, 1991.
At the recent meeting of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in
Valletta, Malta, from January 15-February 8, 1991, the topic was the peaceful settlement of
disputes. In the Report of the Valletta meeting, the participants reaffirmed fundamental principles of
international dispute settlement and specified a procedure for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
See Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (Feb. 8, 1991)
[hereinafter CSCE Valletta Report] (on file with author).
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is increasing acceptance of the variety of processes that might be employed to
address the resolution of international disputes.63 Second, any strategy should
attempt to attract the involvement of the five permanent members of the United
Nations Security Council (the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Great
Britain, and China) and enlarge the net of their participation. Of these countries,
each qualifies its current relationship with the ICJ- some more than others. The
United States does not currently accept the Court's compulsory jurisdiction;
France has resisted involvement since the Nuclear Test cases; 6 4 and China and the
Soviet Union, both with judges on the Court, have never been before the Court
and have avoided adjudication in the Court from the beginning. 65 Only the
United Kingdom currently accepts article 36(2) jurisdiction, but does so with
several significant reservations. 6 The United States, having terminated its ac-
ceptance of the optional clause during the Nicaragua case,67 has nevertheless
proceeded actively with the litigation of several cases via the special chambers
approach. 68 It has agreed to litigate a treaty-based dispute under article 36(1)
before the full Court, and has been involved in an advisory decision addressing
issues under treaties to which it is a party and has substantial interests. 69 Thus,
three patterns of permanent member involvement in particular-the United
Kingdom's limited acceptance of article 36(2), the United States' active use of
the special chambers approach, and its willingness to submit limited issues
involving treaty obligations to the full court-may indicate the current limits of
permanent member involvement and suggest the elements of an approach that
could lead to greater use of the Court by those countries in the future.7 °
Even former President Jimmy Carter now offers his services as a facilitator and conciliator of
international disputes. In Sept. 1989 he served as the intermediary in peace talks in Atlanta, Georgia,
between the Ethiopian Government and Eritrean rebels aimed at ending the 28-year-old civil war.
L.A. Times, Aug. 17, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
63. See generally JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DisPuTEs (H. Mosler & R. Bernhardt
eds. 1974). See also K. BOCKSTIEGEL, ARBITRATION AND STATE ENTERPiSEs-A SURVEY OF THE
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STATE OF LAW AND PRACTICE (1984); and Simmonds, Lapidoth, &
Baade, Roundtable: Public International Arbitration, 22 TEx. INT'L LAW J. 149 (1987).
64. Nuclear Test Cases (Australia, New Zealand v. France), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 457 (July 11).
65. See generally McWhinney, Acceptance and Withdrawal or Denial, of World Court Jurisdic-
tion: Some Recent Trends as to Jurisdiction, 20 ISRAEL L. REV. 148 (1985); E. MCWHINNEY, THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE WESTERN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987)
[hereinafter WEsTERN TRADITION].
66. See 1987-88 I.C.J.Y.B. 96-97.
67. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
68. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Main Area (Canada v. U.S.), 1982
I.C.J. 3 (July 27), which was actually initiated before the Nicaraguan case; and Elettronica Sicula
S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20). See generally Schwebel, Ad Hoc Chambers
of the International Court of Justice, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 831 (1987). See also infra notes 108-14 and
accompanying text. The United States has also indicated its unqualified willingness to participate in
a case before the full Court, in Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), 1989 ICJ 79, although
it will contest the jurisdiction of the ICJ to resolve it.
69. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
70. Rosenne, supra note 8.
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With these concerns in mind, 71 below are suggested approaches and some
proposals for improving the range of compulsory jurisdiction possibilities before
the World Court. In each the focus is on enlarging the role of the World Court
in resolving international disputes; the perspective is that of the United States. As
a nation committed to world order under law, the involvement of the United
States often has been pivotal to the success of the Court. These approaches,
therefore, are assessed in terms of their viability for the United States in partic-
ular, and the world community in general.
2. Reacceptance of the Optional Clause
In the wake of the United States' withdrawal of its forty-year-old commitment
under article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute to submit legal disputes to the Court,72
many condemned the United States as acting inconsistently with its role as a
leading advocate of the peaceful resolution of international disputes and as con-
trary to the national interest. 73 In light of the U.S. position upon withdrawal
74
and the commentary in the aftermath of that action, which also focused on the
deficiencies of the ICJ decision in the Nicaragua case, 75 there may be room
today for considering reacceptance under a revised declaration employing res-
ervations that seek to protect the national interests the United States felt were
jeopardized Under its prior acceptance. Also, some of the concerns, which re-
lated to the geopolitical world structure of several years ago, may have dissi-
pated, perhaps offering new areas for initiatives.
a. U.S. Concerns
The former U.S. declaration, made when the ICJ was new and without the
benefit of experience about how the Court might interpret the various new kinds
of reservations contained therein, had become outdated by the time the United
States withdrew. Indeed, the American Bar Association from the start considered
the Connally Reservation, as it had become known, as "incompatible with the
announced purpose of the United States to join in giving to the Court a broad
jurisdiction; and, if followed by other Nations in filing or renewing their Dec-
71. To these concerns, others might be added (and possibly rebutted). See, e.g., WESTERN
TRADmON, supra note 65, at 137-53.
72. See supra note 13.
73. E.g., Gardner, U.S. Termination of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 421 (1986); T. FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT (1986).
Most recently, the American Society of International Law's Special Working Committee on the
Optional Clause, established in 1986, issued a report recommending acceptance of compulsory
jurisdiction with a variety of reservations protecting U.S. interests. See American Society of Inter-
national Law Special Working Committee on the Optional Clause, Report of the Special Working
Committee on the Optional Clause (Oct., 1990) [hereinafter Society's Optional Clause Report].
74. See Withdrawal Statement, supra note 12.
75. See generally CROSSROADS, supra note 5; THE UNrED STATES AND THE COMPULSORY JURIS-
DICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (A. Arend ed. 1986) [hereinafter Arend].
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larations, would mean that the United States had created the precedent for a serious
backward step through narrowing and impairing the jurisdiction which many
countries have vested in the Court .. 76 History now supports this early as-
sessment, and clearly there was need to rescind the Connally Reservation portion
of the U.S. declaration far in advance of the U.S. withdrawal. The other U.S.
reservation of consequence in the former declaration, the Vandenberg Reserva-
tion,77 also had its problems.78 At the very least, it was in need of a redrafting.
The other U.S. concerns derive in part from the Court's Judgment on the
Merits in the Nicaragua case, which occurred subsequent to its withdrawal. In
general, they include: uncertainty as to the scope and content of the applicable
international law, especially customary international law in a rapidly changing
legal environment; the ability of third parties to intervene in litigation when they
are closely involved or related to the dispute; the justiciability of political dis-
putes with "legal" content, or politicized "legal disputes," especially those
involving the use of armed force; the Court's use of evidence and its require-
ments for the proof of facts; and the Court's partiality (in terms of individual
judge bias against the United States and the Court's alleged non-Western legal
orientation). 79 These reduce to concerns about: (1) the institution itself; (2) the
management of cases, the hearing and decision-making processes of the Court;
and (3) the party's ability to control the jurisdiction of the Court. While the first
two areas are matters largely of institutional reform and therefore subject either
to multilateral action by Member States through the established United Nations
procedures or to revision of operating procedures by the Court's judges them-
selves,8 0 the third concern at least partially involves the parties' capacity by way
of the Court's consensual basis of jurisdiction to limit the jurisdiction of the
76. See ABA POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK (1986-87) in which it was reported that
the ABA House of Delegates unanimously passed a resolution in December 1945 urging the
President and the Senate to take action "at the earliest practicable time" to accept the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ. Following that action, the ABA House of Delegates at its midyear meeting
in February 1947 adopted a resolution which supported the ICJ's article 36(2) jurisdiction but
called for the withdrawal of the Connally reservation as part of the U.S. declaration. This 1947
resolution was reaffirmed by the House of Delegates at the August 1960 Annual Meeting after
extensive debate and a vote of 114 to 107. Id. Other documentation was not available in the ABA
archives, which indicates that the resolution was again reaffirmed by the House of Delegates in
1973.
77. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
78. See Morrison, Potential Revisions to the Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice by the United States of America, in Arend, supra note 75, at 29,
34-35. Professor Morrison points out that the text of the reservation "excludes cases involving other
parties which will be 'affected by the decision.' Yet other parties could not be affected by a decision
until it has been rendered." Id.
79. See Withdrawal Statement, supra note 12. Many of these issues are also addressed in
CROSSROADS, supra note 5. Some of these concerns have been around for some time and can be found
addressed in earlier assessments of the Court. See, e.g., FUrURtE OF ICJ, supra note 35.
80. See N. SINGH, supra note 21, at 345-46.
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Court.8 1 Thus, when unilaterally accepting the Court's jurisdiction over various
disputes under the optional clause, states can limit the Court's jurisdiction by
reservations contained in their declarations.
b. Possible Reservations
To address these concerns, Professor Sohn and others have offered their so-
lutions.8 2 Generally, they propose accepting article 36(2) jurisdiction with
"clearly defined, limited conditions," 83 rather than propose either acceptance
without substantial reservations or acceptance with broad, unlimited reserva-
tions. As Professor Sohn has pointed out, the employment of broad reservations
under the operation of reciprocity would limit "the United States' ability to utilize
the Court when other states violate its rights or those of its citizens." 84 The
unrestricted acceptance of article 36(2), on the other hand, would not adequately
protect U.S. interests as long as many other states continue to limit their decla-
rations.
One of the most problematic aspects of these proposals, posed in stark terms
by the Nicaragua litigation, is how to limit the Court's jurisdiction regarding
cases that involve continuing armed hostilities or those affecting national or
collective security interests. .A reservation eliminating the Court's jurisdiction to
adjudicate such a dispute still, under article 36(6) of the ICJ Statute, would be
subject to Court interpretation. But by avoiding subjective provisions and as-
suming the Court's jurisdiction would terminate if the dispute were referred to
the Security Council or a competent regional organization, a reservation could
conceivably be formulated to protect U.S. interests. Professor Sohn's formula-
tion of such a reservation is useful to consider in these regards:
[This declaration does not apply to] disputes relating to any question which affects the
national security of the United States of America or of a state party to a collective
security arrangement to which the United States of America is also a party, except when
one of the parties to the dispute has referred the matter to the Security Council of the
United Nations or the appropriate regional collective security organization and the
Security Council or the organization has recommended that certain specific legal ques-
tions be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice."5
81. This capacity is, of course, subject to the inherent ability of a judicial body to determine its
jurisdiction, which is also expressly indicated in the ICJ Statute at article 36(6).
82. See Sohn, Suggestions for the Limited Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice by the United States, 18 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 1 (1988); and Society's
Optional Clause Report, supra note 73. Among the others who have also offered proposals are:
Professors Anthony D'Amato, Richard Falk, Thomas Franck, L.F.E. Goldie, Leo Gross, and Ri-
chard Gardner. A number of student comments in law reviews have also been generated by this topic.
83. See Sohn, supra note 82, at 2.
84. Id. at 2. Sohn adds that "That is especially true as other states are more likely to invoke
such a reservation than is the United States, which is more susceptible to the pressure of public
opinion," Id.
85. Id. at 12.
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3. Development of a Compulsory Jurisdiction
Network via Article 36(1)
Article 36(1) jurisdiction of the ICJ comprehends submission of disputes
(including nonlegal disputes)8 6 in three ways: by compromis or by treaty sub-
mitting a particular existing dispute to the Court; by compromissory clause; and
by general treaty. Of the three, the latter two are considered to have compulsory
jurisdiction effect. 8 7 The first, although beneficial to broadening the jurisdiction
of the Court, does not subject the parties to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court since at the time the dispute arises there is no obligation for the states to
adjudicate their dispute before the Court. It is only after the dispute arises and the
parties agree to do so by compromis that the obligation arises. Where states agree
in advance of a dispute that they will be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court,
as they may do by compromissory clauses and general treaties on dispute set-
tlement, a situation of compulsory jurisdiction exists.
Because of the deficiencies of the article 36(2) compulsory jurisdiction ap-
proach, various initiatives using these two article 36(1) techniques have re-
ceived attention in recent years,88 and the article 36(1) approach has gained new
favor as a method for building the network of compulsory jurisdiction once
promised by the optional clause. The article 36(1) approach offers improved
prospects for several reasons. First, when states agree to a treaty that includes a
clause referring disputes arising under it to the ICJ, there is already a degree of
mutuality in the act of agreement that is missing in a unilateral declaration under
article 36(2). Although states may still have disputes about the meaning of the
text of such a treaty, they are of a different character: states may dispute the
meaning of something to which they have already given mutual consent, rather
than contest the consequences of each other's unilateral acts and debate the
reciprocity of the consent given. Second, conferral of jurisdiction on the Court
by article 36(1) allows parties to specify the particular question presented. In this
way states may delimit the scope of the dispute to be decided and even define the
international law to be applied, arguably, to a greater degree than would be
allowed under article 36(2).
a. Compromissory Clause and General Treaty Approaches
These benefits of greater consent between disputing parties about the nature of
the jurisdiction conferred on the Court, especially in light of the negative aspects
of the compulsory jurisdiction regime under article 36(2), have encouraged some
86. See I.C.J. Statute art. 36, para. 1, which refers to "all cases which the parties refer to it and
all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions
in force" (emphasis added). Contrast this text with that of art. 36, para. 2 which refers to "all legal
disputes" (emphasis added).
87. See Lutz, supra note 52, and accompanying text.
88. Id.
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new initiatives. Foremost among these initiatives are those put forth by the
Soviet Union, the United States, and the American Bar Association.
i. Initiatives by the Soviet Union and United States. In the past several years
both the Soviet Union and United States have taken steps to submit more disputes
to the Court's jurisdiction and have proposed new ways by which they and other
nations might strengthen the jurisdiction of the Court. Beginning in late 1988
with Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev's speech at the United Nations, the
Soviet Union committed itself to a greater reliance on the United Nations,
vaguely encouraged the permanent members to provide new mechanisms for
resolution of disputes amongst them, and specified that "the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice at the Hague as regards the interpretation and
implementation of agreements on human rights should be binding on all
states. ' 8 9 Following this rhetoric, in March 1989, the Soviet Union reversed its
long-standing policy of refusing to submit to any outside jurisdiction and an-
nounced its willingness to accept the ICJ's jurisdiction in disputes concerning
five international human rights conventions: 9 ° the 1948 Genocide Convention;
9
'
the 1949 Convention Banning the Trafficking in Prostitutes and Similar Forms of
Slavery;92 the 1953 Convention on the Political Rights of Women;93 the 1966
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion;94 and the 1984 Convention Outlawing Torture. 95 A few months later, the
United States and Soviet Union also agreed to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ
in disputes between them arising under seven treaties to which both are parties:
five involving aircraft hijacking, sabotage, and acts of terrorism, and two relating
to drug trafficking.
96
Several proposals suggest new directions for the five permanent members of
the Security Council with respect to their acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction.
At the initiative of the United States and in response to Gorbachev's vague
suggestion in his U.N. address in 1988 calling for the five permanent members
to strengthen the World Court by accepting its compulsory jurisdiction in spec-
89. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1988, at A6, col. 4.
90. N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1989, at Al, col. 4.
91. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, done Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277.
92. Convention for the Suppression of the Trafficking and Exploitation of Prostitution of Others,
opened for signature Mar. 21, 1950, 96 U.N.T.S. 271.
93. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. No.
8289, 193 U.N.T.S. 135.
94. International Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
95. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, done Dec. 10, 1984, entered into force June 26, 1987, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984).
96. N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1989, at A5, col. 1. The agreement provides for disputes to be settled
by a special chamber of five judges chosen by the contesting sides from the fifteen-member Court.
The treaties, among other provisions, require the countries to extradite or put on trial accused
terrorists and narcotics racketeers and to seize drug smugglers' assets.
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ified areas of international law, the Soviet Union and the United States are jointly
developing a common approach to the jurisdiction of the Court for the five
permanent members that could be embodied in an agreement open to all coun-
tries. 9 7 The official communique indicates that
[B]oth countries agree that the Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council
should lead the way in making greater use of the Court on mutually agreed conditions.
The proposals center on three general ideas:
(1) relying on existing treaties to identify disputes to be applied;
(2) providing the opportunity to select a chamber chosen from among the members
of the full Court to adjudicate a dispute; and
(3) excluding from the jurisdiction of the Court certain categories of issues that are
widely recognized to be highly sensitive to states and inappropriate for resolution by
judicial action in the absence of the express consent of the states involved.98
Both countries are still discussing these ideas with the other permanent
members with the objective of developing a common approach to the Court's
jurisdiction among the five that could be framed into an agreement open to
other countries.
Last, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union offered
another initiative in a letter to the U.N. General Assembly of September 29,
1989. 99 It called for states to agree to a general treaty on dispute settlement, in
which they would be obliged to submit disputes progressively to a variety of
resolution processes; a drawn-out dispute would eventually be subject to the
jurisdiction of the Court under the treaty. The stated aim of the Soviet Union was
to elaborate "through the United Nations a comprehensive international strategy
for establishing the primacy of the rule of law in relations between states." 1oo
The United States and Soviet Union are still discussing ways for implementing
this initiative.
ii. ABA Resolution. The implications of these initiatives, and the ap-
proaches under article 36(1) they involve, are best revealed in the resolution
approved by the ABA House of Delegates at the 1989 ABA Annual Meeting.' 01
As a result of the preparatory work of the ABA Blue Ribbon Committee on the
Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, the ABA Sections
of International Law and Practice and of Tort and Insurance Practice, and the
Standing Committee on World Order Under Law, combined to recommend to the
House of Delegates approval of a U.S. policy of negotiating agreements with
other states consenting to the jurisdiction of the Court. The resolution adopted by
the ABA proposed the United States take several steps toward promoting in-
creased use of the Court. In summary form, it proposed that:
97. U.S. Department of State, Fact Sheet on International Court of Justice Initiative (Sept. 23,
1989) (on file with author).
98. Id.; see also N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1989, at A5, col. 1.
99. U.N. Doc. A/44/585 (1989); see also N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1989, at A4, col. 1.
100. Id. This proposal is similar to the treaty proposed several years ago by the ABA's Standing
Committee on World Order Under Law. See Draft General Treaty, supra note 19, at 261.
101. Delegates Approve Wide Range of Politics, ABA WASH. LETrER, Sept. 1, 1989, at 9.
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[1] the U.S. could negotiate a series of treaties with various states or groups of states
accepting the jurisdiction of the ICJ with respect to disputes arising under international
agreements to which the disputants are parties but which do not currently contain
effective provisions for the settlement of such disputes[;...
2.] the U.S. and Soviet Union could conclude a treaty under which they would agree
to submit to the ICJ or to a Special Chamber of the ICJ any dispute between them
relating to the interpretation or application of international conventions which they both
have ratified and which are listed in the annex to the treaty[;
3. a] similar treaty could also be made for international dispute settlement with NATO
members, submitting to the ICJ or to a Special Chamber of the Court any dispute
between any two or more members relating to the interpretation or application of any
one of the international conventions in an annex to the dispute-settlement treaty and
ratified by the parties to the dispute. 102
b. Special Chambers: "New Wine in Old Bottles"
Many of the new initiatives by the Soviet Union and United States provide for
referral of disputes to a chamber of the Court; other proposals, such as those
offered by the ABA, contemplate the option of states submitting to the jurisdic-
tion of a special chamber of the Court, and not to the full Court. By employing
the special chamber approach, parties submitting disputes to the Court gain a
degree of additional control over the composition of the judicial body. Although
justices of the ICJ include some of the most able and distinguished jurists avail-
able, factors such as legal training and national perspective undoubtedly affect
the outlook of individual justices and are relevant considerations in deciding
whether to submit a dispute to the Court. 103 Even though critics challenge this
"chambers" approach as detracting from the universal character of the Court
and impeding the progressive development of international law, 104 the use of
special chambers in the last few years since its first use in the Gulf of Maine case
represents a significant portion of contentious litigation before the ICJ, and a
fertile area for new initiatives. 105
102. Lutz, The World Court and the Rule of Law: An Editorial Comment, 2 CALIF. INT'L L. SEcr.
NEWSL. 1 (1989); see also ABA Section of International Law and Practice, Minutes of Council
Meeting (Apr. 29, 1989). For the text of the resolution, see 24 INT'L LAW. 863 (1990).
103. Sofaer, supra note 9, at 481.
104. A great deal of commentary has been generated by the "chambers" approach-some of it
by the justices of the ICJ themselves. See, e.g., Schwebel, Ad Hoc Chambers of the International
Court of Justice, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 831 (1987); Oda, Further Thoughts on the Chambers Procedure
of the International Court of Justice, 82 Am. J. INT'L L. 556 (1988). The opinions of the judges
opposing the establishment of a special chamber in the Gulf of Maine case, Judges Morozov and
EI-Khani, are noteworthy. See Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries in Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v.
U.S.), 1982 I.C.J. 3, 11 (order of Jan. 20) (Morozov); id. at 13 (El-Khani); see also Zimmermann,
Ad Hoc Chambers of the International Court of Justice, 8 DcIKINsoN J. INT'L L. 1 (1989); Green, "Is
There a Universal International Law Today?" 23 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 3 (1985); McWhinney, Special
Chambers within the International Court of Justice: The Preliminary Procedural Aspect of the Gulf
of Maine Case, 12 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 1 (1985); Ostrihansky, Chambers of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 30 (1988); Leigh & Ramsey, Confidence in the Court:
It Need Not Be a "Hollow Chamber," in CROSSROADS, supra note 5, at 106.
105. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundaries in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1982
I.C.J. 3 (order of Jan. 20); Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), 1985 I.C.J. 6 (order of Apr. 3);
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Despite the only recent use of the chambers process, it has been available from
the beginning under the Court's Statute. 106 Its flexibility and reception by a
number of major states provide a basis for enhancing and enlarging the jurisdic-
tion of the Court. Even though it is not the same as a universal acceptance of the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court hoped for by some, the special chambers
approach can allow for a "small but significant accretion to the Court's com-
pulsory jurisdiction." 107
[T]he ad hoc Chamber embodies a practical and productive option, an option that the
drafters of the Statute of the International Court of Justice introduced-wisely, it is
believed. As so often in international law and life, it illustrates the case in which the
best should not be allowed to become the enemy of the good."0 8
4. Expanding the Court's Advisory Jurisdiction
Most would argue that the advisory jurisdiction of the Court does not constitute
compulsory jurisdiction. Decisions rendered under it are not binding, and states
are not actually parties to the proceedings before the Court. 109 On the other
hand, when an advisory proceeding is before the Court, it has a compulsory
element to it. Irrespective of a state's agreement to be a party to such a proceeding,
the General Assembly, Security Council, U.N. organ, or specialized agency may
request an opinion on any legal question involving interests of a state;' l ° and
once an opinion is rendered contrary to a state's interests, the pressure of the
international community to respect such a decision, as well as the actions U.N.
entities legitimately may take pursuant to the opinion, may have the practical, if
not actual, effect of a binding judgment under compulsory jurisdic-
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras), 1987 I.C.J. 10 (order of
May 8); Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1987 I.C.J. 3 (order of Mar. 2); and
Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), 1988
I.C.J. 66 (order of Oct. 14).
106. The Statute of the International Court of Justice provides for various kinds of Chambers. The special Chambers
for dealing with 'particular categories of cases; for example, labor cases and cases relating to transit and com-
munications,' set up on an ad hoc basis (art. 26, par. 1), originated in the similar Chambers contemplated by the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, which were preconstituted to meet possible postwar
requirements of the implementation of the Treaty of Versailles and the other Treaties of Peace, but were never
employed in that Court's history of nearly twenty years. There is another type of Chamber, that of summary
procedure (art. 29), which was also inaugurated by the old Court but was employed only once in its history. Neither
of these two types of Chambers has ever been resorted to in the International Court of Justice .... [The] ad hoc
Chamber for dealing with a particular case . . . may be formed at any time by the Court (art. 26, par. 2), but no
such Chamber was known to the old Court.
Oda, supra note 104, at 556 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added); see also 1987-1988 I.C.J.Y.B.
13-15 (1988).
107. See Leigh & Ramsey, supra note 104, at 122. Proposals for the use of the chambers device
have been made with respect to specific categories of disputes, e.g., cultural property, environmental.
See, e.g., Comment, A Proposal for the Second Use of the International Court of Justice Chamber
Mechanism, 1 J. INT'L DISPUTE RES. 239 (1987).
108. See Schwebel, supra note 104, at 854.
109. Even where a state objects to the Court's advisory jurisdiction, the Court may exercise its
advisory jurisdiction. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (advisory opinion of Oct. 16).
110. U.N. Charter art. 96.
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tion. Moreover, a compulsory jurisdiction effect can occur if states agree in
advance in a treaty that they will be bound by any advisory opinion of the ICJ. 1 '
While the activity of the Court under the advisory jurisdiction authority has
been limited in its present institutional framework,' 2 some have advocated a
larger advisory jurisdictional role for the ICJ, 113 and some have pressed for an
enlarged role without the need to revise the U.S. Charter or ICJ Statute.114
Probably the most interesting is a proposal to expand the ICJ's advisory opinion
jurisdiction to include questions of international law referred by nationai
courts.11 5 The proposal suggested that the United States create a procedure
whereby a domestic court faced with a complex issue of international law could
gain the benefit of an advisory opinion of the ICJ on that issue. Implementation
of such a procedure would require the establishment of a special U.N. committee
to request advisory opinions on behalf of duly authorized national courts. The
special committee, authorized by the U.N. General Assembly, would review
requests from national courts and refer them to the ICJ on behalf of the General
Assembly, as prescribed by article 91 of the U.N. Charter.
116
Such a procedure would undoubtedly increase the workload of the Court and
contribute to the development of international law, much as a similar procedure
before the Court of Justice of the European Communities has enhanced that
institution.1 17 Certainly, in light of the small number of the Court's adyisory
opinions to date (thirteen requested by the General Assembly and one by the
Security Council' 18), there is room for more cases and greater variety of activity
by way of this form of jurisdiction. 19
111. See Szasz, Enhancing the Advisory Competence of the World Court, in FUTURE OF ICJ, supra
note 35, at 499, 501.
112. Since 1946, the ICJ has rendered 20 advisory opinions. 1987-1988 I.C.J.Y.B. 56 (1988).
113. See Szasz, supra note 111; see also M. WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 650
(1976).
114. Sohn, Broadening the Advisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 77 Am. J.
INT'L L. 124 (1983).
115. See ABA, ABA POLICIES AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK (1986-87), which indicates that the
February 1982 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates adopted a resolution proposing this
advisory opinion jurisdiction. This was followed by congressional action in House Concurrent
Resolution 86, as amended, which expressed the sense of Congress that the President explore the
possibility of expanding the advisory opinion jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. This
resolution passed the House by unanimous consent on December 17, 1982. H.R. Con. Res. 98, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. 98 (1982) (as amended). I
116. For a more recent general analysis of this proposal, see Schwebel, Preliminary Rulings by
the International Court of Justice at the Instance of National Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 495 (1988).
Cf. Rosenne, Preliminary Rulings by the International Court of Justice at the Instance of National
Courts: A Reply, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 401 (1989).
117. European Economic Community Treaty, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 173, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 75-76.
118. See 1987-88 I.C.J.Y.B. at 54 nn.3-4 (1988).
119. E.g., in the last congressional session a bill was introduced by Senator Patrick Moynihan
expressing the sense of Congress that the United States should seek to obtain an Advisory Opinion
from the I.C.J. concerning the right of self-determination of the people of Lithuania. See S. Con.
Res. 112, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REc. S3594 (1990).
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5. Making the Court More Accessible to Poor Countries
To many of the world's nations, use of the ICJ is a luxury. Because of the
escalating expense of litigation before the Court, many states find they are
foreclosed from using the Court. As the cost of litigation increases, the ability of
many states to afford this form of international dispute settlement actually de-
creases. 20 Finding ways to overcome such barriers, along with the suggestions
made here to increase confidence and enlarge the jurisdiction of the Court, can
contribute to strengthening the Court's jurisdictional base.
One such contribution to relieving poorer nations from the financial burden of
bringing a case in the Court was the establishment in November 1989 of the
"Secretary-General's Trust Fund to Assist States in the Settlement of Disputes
through the International Court of Justice." 1 2 1 The purpose of the Fund is "to
provide ... financial assistance to states for expenses incurred in connection
with: (i) a dispute submitted to the International Court of Justice by way of a
special agreement; or (ii) the execution of a Judgment of the Court resulting from
such special agreement."'
' 22
6. Enhancing Compliance with Court Judgments
Judgments of courts are of little value unless they are complied with in some
fashion. For international judicial institutions to survive, states must abide by
their judgments. In international affairs, compliance with judgments of interna-
tional courts may be quite obvious or may occur in obscure ways.' 23 To the
extent that there are enforcement mechanisms, reliance for compliance with
judgments of international courts is placed upon the legal institutions at the
national level because of the decentralized nature of the international system.' 
2 4
In the United States the responsibility for complying with an ICJ judgment
involves complex constitutional issues. To the extent that some of these issues
have been addressed, the United States has not indicated how such issues would
be addressed as a matter of course. Some would argue that the issue of compli-
ance would normally fall upon the Executive Branch for constitutional reasons,
120. See generally Bien-Aime, A Pathway to The Hague and Beyond: The United Nations Trust
Fund Proposal, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 671 (1990). See also L.A. Times, Mar. 24, 1990, at
A13, col. I which reports that the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development found that the
number of "least-developed" countries rose from 31 in 1981 to 42 in 1990, with 28 of the 42 in
Africa. These countries were classified by the standard of per capita annual gross domestic product
of $200 or less. See generally INDEPENDENT COMM'N ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES,
NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL (1980) (also known as the Willy Brandt Report).
121. See 28 I.L.M. 1589 (1989).
122. Id. at 1592.
123. E.g., Iran's compliance with the ICJ judgment in the Hostages Case, U.S. Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran) 1980 I.C.J. 3 (judgment of May 24), did not occur until the
Algiers Accord between the United States and Iran freeing the American hostages and setting up the
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal at The Hague. Although one could argue Iran's actions did not respond
directly to the edict of the Court, they had a similar effect.
124. See R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 65-66
(1964); J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 100-02 (H. Waldock 6th ed. 1963).
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considering that the matter was one involving foreign affairs issues or political
issues or both. Congress might have some role in the equation of acts constituting
compliance, since, if reparations are required, funds might have to be appropri-
ated. And, the judicial branch of the United States Government provides the
means by which judgments from foreign judicial bodies are normally recognized
and enforced within the United States.
The prospect of complying with the ICJ's Nicaragua judgment raised many of
these concerns. Notwithstanding the municipal law considerations previously
mentioned, 125 the course of compliance under the U.N. Charter, especially when
involving a permanent member, can pose significant issues. Although each mem-
ber of the United Nations undertakes to comply with ICJ decisions in cases to
which it is a party, 126 the enforcement role that the Security Council is capable
of playing 127 is limited by the veto power of permanent members. 12
8
Thus, ensuring compliance with ICJ judgments is another way by which the
jurisdiction of the ICJ can be improved. The variety and expanse of U.S. prop-
erty interests and assets abroad makes the United States quite vulnerable to the
enforcement of ICJ judgments against it in foreign countries. 129 Although risking
such enforcement efforts in other countries and the foreign policy costs they
might include might be within an assessment of the reasonable costs involved in
a major power's international affairs, 130 the nobler, and perhaps more politically
astute, approach would be for the United States to contribute to an international
enforcement network for such judgments, much like it did for the enforcement of
125. For a treatment of these issues in greater detail, see, e.g., Comment, Enforcement ofl.C.J.
Decisions in United States Courts, 11 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 73 (1987); Lieverman, Law and
Power: Some Reflections on Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court, 10 MD. J. INT'L L.
& TRADE 295 (1986).
126. U.N. CHARTER art. 94.
127. See U.N. CHARTER chs. vi & vii.
128. U.N. CHARTER art. 27. For example, when Nicaragua applied to the Security Council for
enforcement of the ICJ judgment in the Nicaragua case pursuant to article 94 of the U.N. Charter,
the United States exercised its veto. See U.N. SCOR (2704th mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/PV. 2704 (1986),
reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1352, 1363 (1986).
129. See Meyer, U.S. Snub of World Court Won't Avert Day of Reckoning, L.A. Times, Sept. 25,
1988, pt. V, at 5, col. 2:
A money judgment does not require further U.N. action. Although we became a 'debtor nation' a couple of years
ago, we have vulnerable assets all over the world.
... tW]e had better remember that so-called 'sovereign immunity' is not necessarily going to be a shield for
our assets, even among the friendliest of our allies .... 'The immunity cannot prevail over the obligations of the
state under the United Nations Charter to carry out the Court's decision.'
See also O'Connell, The Prospects for Enforcing Monetary Judgments of the International Court
of Justice: A Study of Nicaragua's Judgment Against the United States, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 891 (1990).
130. The reputation of a nation as law-abiding or the esteem in which other states hold a particular
nation may have significant impact on whether a state complies with a judgment by an international
tribunal. Thus, states with no direct involvement in a case may exert diplomatic and political pressure
on another state to comply with the judgment of an international body. See, e.g., the European
Parliament's adoption of a resolution calling on the United States to pay Nicaragua compensation for
damage it caused in violation of international law, as ruled by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. Europe
Backs Managua's Claim, Washington Post, Mar. 16, 1990, at A42, col. 1. See generally E. ZOLLER,
ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH U.S. LEGISLATION (1985); C. GRAY, JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN
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foreign arbitral awards. 1 31 With respect to the United States, this would involve
building mechanisms within its complex constitutional framework so that such
judgments would be enforceable, and involve developing an international net-
work amongst other national law systems to enable enforcement in other coun-
tries. An enforcement regime of this nature would obviate the defenses of public
policy or national interest to enforcement, and limit the ability of a state to resist
enforcement on the basis of its unique municipal legal structure.
B. REFORMING THE IC: A CHANGING WORLD
REQUIRES A REVISED COURT STRUCTURE
Although some of the "winds of change" counsel modifications in existing
state relationships to the ICJ that do not involve revision of the basic ICJ insti-
tutional structure, others call for more fundamental restructuring. Yet reforming
the World Court is not an easy process if it requires changing the ICJ Statute or
amending the U.N. Charter. 132 Despite a number of General Assembly exami-
nations of the Court's role in the pacific settlement of international disputes, no
substantive changes in either the Charter or Statute have occurred. 133 Enlarging
its jurisdictional base, for example, by enabling parties other than states to use
the Court would require an amendment to the Statute of the Court. 134 Such
fundamental change in the World Court depends on a unanimity of support
required for amendment of the Statute or Charter that is unlikely to materialize,
even with the considerable good will present today. Other changes may involve
less drastic and complicated measures, such as revision of the ICJ's Rules of
Court, which would be within the control of the judges. 135
The vast literature about reforming the ICJ contains 136 a range of meritorious
suggestions that establish targets of reform and introduce initiatives to improve
the Court. Given the depth of concern about international order in these fast-
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1987); M. DOXEY, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE
(1987); C. JENKS, supra note 45, at 663-726.
13 1. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (implemented in the U.S. by 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-208).
132. The consent of all Permanent Members of the Security Council is required to ratify an
amendment. See U.N. CHARTER art. 109, para. 2. See also I.C.J. Statute art. 69.
133. See G.A. Res. 171(11), Nov. 14, 1947 (on need for greater use of the ICJ by the U.N. and
its organs); G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Oct. 24, 1970, (entitled Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the U.N.); Res. 3232 (XXIX), Nov. 12, 1974, (review of the role of the ICJ); G.A. Res.
37/10, Nov. 15, 1982, (peaceful settlement of disputes and the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful
Settlement of International Disputes.) See also N. SINGH, supra note 21, at 44-49.
134. See I.C.J. Statute art. 34.
135. See ICJ LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 6, at 52-53.
136. See, e.g., Gross, Conclusions, in FUTURE OF ICJ, supra note 35, at 727; JUDICIAL SETTLE-
MENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES (H. Mosler & R. Bernhardt eds. 1974) [hereinafter JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT]; R. FALK, REVIVING THE WORLD COURT (1986); T. FRANCK, supra note 73; CROSSROADS,
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moving times and the role international dispute resolution can play to enhance
the prospects of stability, it is not an unrealistic prospect that ICJ reform will be
an important agenda item for the international community. Although no pretense
is made here that fundamental change in the institution is likely in the near term,
it is useful to identify some of the proposals that have received attention from
commentators. The reform proposals attracting commentary1 37 have generally
addressed either increasing the use of the Court or revising the process by which
the Court is selected and operates.
1. Increasing Use of the Court
The major proposals in this category have generally addressed the adjustment
of the process and nature of compulsory jurisdiction under article 36(2) of the
Statute and, more generally, the expansion of the subject matter jurisdiction of
the Court. Those concerned with reforming article 36(2) propose mandatory
compulsory jurisdiction for all U.N. members, 138 or recommend a fundamental
revision of the voluntariness of the existing article 36(2): rather than allowing
states to opt in to that compulsory jurisdiction regime, all members of the U.N.
would be subject to compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ unless they opted out of
it. Further, suggestions have been made to clarify the acceptability of certain
reservations contained in states' declarations and to endorse a set of model
clauses that might be proposed by the International Law Commission.' 39
The expansion of the Court's subject matter jurisdiction has been the subject
of broad-ranging recommendations:
(1) They have proposed that the Court's currently exclusive adjudicative
process t4° be expanded to allow it to be the forum for the administration of a
variety of dispute-settlement processes that would be available to states for the
settlement of their disputes. 141
(2) Some have suggested expanding the advisory jurisdiction of the Court,
making it possible for the Court to issue authoritative interpretations of treaties
supra note 5; C. JENKS, supra, note 45; Rosenne, supra note 8; Dalfen, The World Court: Reform
or Re-Appraisal, 1968 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 212; Partan, Introduction: Increasing the Effectiveness of
the International Court, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J. 559 (1977); Qadeer, The International Court of Justice:
A Proposal to Amend Its Statute, 5 Hous. J. INT'L L. 35 (1982); Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S.
Dep't of State, Widening Access to the International Court of Justice (1975), reprinted in E. Mc-
DowELL, 1976 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 650.
137. See id.
138. See Qadeer, supra note 136, at 39-46.
139. See FUTURE OF ICJ, supra note 35, at 730-31.
140. The largely moribund Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague still exists. The 1899
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes established it. Seventy-one
states are participants, but no cases have been heard since 1971. See I. BROWNIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PuBLIc INTERNATIONAL LAW 710 (4th ed. 1990); Hudson, supra note 23, at 6-36.
141. Such a revision in the Court's jurisdiction would offer the panoply of processes by which
states settle their disputes. It would respond to some of the deficiencies of the adjudicative process,
and could take into account the varietal nature of disputes arising between and among states. See,
e.g., Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the Evolving Structure of
International Dispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 104, 151-55 (1990).
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and to ascertain the existence and definition of customary international law. 142
Others have focused on extending the Court's advisory jurisdiction to include
appeals from national courts. 1
43
(3) The expansion of the contentious jurisdiction of the Court to enable
international organizations and, in some cases, individuals to be parties has
also been recommended. 144
(4) An additional recommendation, regarding the status of third-party states
when they are related to a dispute before the Court, proposes clarification of
the rights of such third parties to participate or not participate in the litiga-
tion. 145
(5) Commentators have proposed that the Court establish several specialized
chambers to offer ready expertise in areas likely to attract states to litigate
before the Court.' 46
2. Reforming the Process of Judicial Election
and the Operation of the Court
Criticism regarding the politicization of the selection of judges has surrounded
the Court for some time. 147 In recent years, the controversy has been fueled by
the emergence of regional voting blocs and the apparent expectation of Western
states, in particular the major powers, of "seats" on the Court, although none
142. See, e.g., Schwebel, Widening the Advisory Jurisdiction ofthe International Court ofJustice
Without Amending Its Statute, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 355 (1984); Jessup, To Form a More Perfect
United Nations, 9 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 177 (1970).
143. See generally Note, Allowing Federal Courts Access to International Court of Justice Advi-
sory Opinions: Critique and Proposal, 6 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 745 (1983).
144. See Gross, Review of the Role of the International Court of Justice, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 487
(1972); 2 FuTuRE OF ICJ, supra note 35, at 732-33; and Qadeer, supra note 136, at 49.
145. This recommendation stems largely from reaction to the jurisdictional decision in the Nic-
aragua case (1984 I.C.J. 425, 431). See Norton, The Nicaragua Case, Political Questions Before the
International Court of Justice, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 459, 488 (date):
In [the ICJ's decision regarding jurisdiction in the Nicaragua case,] ... the Court appears to hold that, if it
establishes jurisdiction over two parties to a multilateral dispute, the other parties must either intervene on the
merits against their wishes or risk having their rights adjudicated without their participation.... T]he Court's
approach... is fundamentally at odds with the most basic premise of the Court's jurisdiction: that it is based on
the consent of states.
See also Damrosch, Multilateral Disputes, in CROSSROADS, supra note 5, at 376, 399-400; and
Charney, Third State Remedies in International Law, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 57 (1989).
146. I.C.J. Statute art. 26, para. I provides that the Court may occasionally form one or more
chambers, composed of three or more judges, as the Court may determine, for dealing with particular
categories of cases. Although the Court has never formed such a chamber, Judges Singh and Lachs
for some time have encouraged the Court to form a chamber to deal with environmental disputes. See
N. SINGH, supra note 21, at 164-65; Lachs, The Revised Procedure of the International Court of
Justice, in ESSAYS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (FESTScHRIFr PAN-
HuYs) 43 (1980). The 1987-1988 I.C.J.Y.B. reports:
[The Court] took the view that it was not necessary to set up a standing special chamber, but emphasized that it
was able to respond rapidly to requests for the constitution, pursuant to Article 26, paragraph 2, of the Statute, of
a special chamber to which any case, and therefore any environmental case, could he submitted.
Id. at 15.
147. See generally WESTERN TRADITION, supra note 65, at 73-83; Rosenne, The Changing Role,
supra note 8, at 195-96.
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is prescribed by the ICJ Statute or U.N. Charter. 148 These concerns have carried
over to questions about the independence of judges from political pressures of
their home countries in the disposition of their duties. 149 Yet, according to the
Statute, judges should not be elected as representatives of a particular state or
region and should act in office independent of the state that nominates them:
"The Court [should] be composed of a body of independent judges, elected
regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who
possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment
to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence in
international law.
' 150
Thus, in light of this concern about the independence of the Court, various
proposals for making the Court more independent and less political have fallen
into the following categories. First, it has been recommended that the process
of election of judges to the Court be improved to ensure their quality and
independence, that is, insulation of the process from U.N. politics. Second, it
has been recommended that various techniques be devised to guarantee the
continuing independence of the judges while serving, for example, long-term
tenure and status as a "citizen of the United Nations." The Court's operation-
its procedures, the law it applies and how it applies it-has also been
scrutinized in the commentary about ICJ reform. In this category of concerns
belong recommendations to: (1) streamline judicial procedures to accelerate the
time involved in litigating before the World Court;15 1 (2) simplify the process
of amending the Statute; (3) revise the sources of law used by the Court
to include "United Nations law;" ' 152 and (4) make the Court more rigorous in
148. See WESTERN TRADMON, supra note 65, at 73-83. This latter phenomenon has become
particularly important to the major powers since fears that non-Western legal perspectives of inter-
national law will be applied by non-Western coalitions of judges on the Court. Id. at 74, 137-39; see
also McWhinney, supra 65, at 150-52.
149. See supra note 5.
150. I.C.J. Statute arts. 2, 3; see also LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 6, at 166-90.
151. E.g., the imposition of strict time-limits on certain actions has been suggested. For addi-
tional suggestions, see FUrURE OF ICJ, supra note 35, at 737.
152. This could involve amending article 38 of the Statute to include "U.N. law" as contained
in U.N. General Assembly resolutions, declarations and decisions of U.N. organizations, and so
forth, or it could involve broadening the existing definition of customary international law under the
Statute. The current position of the United States on whether U.N. General Assembly resolutions can
be regarded as declaratory of international law is contained in the following:
As a broad statement of U.S. policy in this regard, I think it is fair to state that General Assembly resolutions are
regarded as recommendations to Member States of the United Nations.
To the extent, which is exceptional, that such resolutions are meant to be declaratory of international law, are
adopted with support of all members, and are observed by the practice of states, such resolutions are evidence of
customary international law on a particular subject matter.
E. McDowELL, 1975 DIGEST OF THE UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (state-
ment of S. Schwebel, Deputy Legal Adviser to the Department of State, and currently a judge on the
ICJ). With respect to the role of international organizations in the development of international law,
see Vignes, The Impact of International Organizations on the Development and Application of Public
International Law, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 809 (R. MacDonald &
D. Johnston eds. 1983).
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its application of burdens of proof when evaluating evidence presented by liti-
gants before the Court.1
5 3
IV. Conclusion
A. THE CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF THE PAST
The idealism of earlier visions of a World Court that would, perforce by its
performance, merit states' acceptances of its compulsory jurisdiction, now must
be replaced by the realism of its forty-five-year experience, the recent practice of
states, and an objective appraisal of the Court's capacity to address future in-
ternational issues. The world stands at the threshold of a new era, and this
dynamic period can offer new opportunities for the Court in its mission to
provide a means of establishing world order. The United States too, as a world
power with new responsibilities and vulnerabilities, is presented with opportu-
nities to assist in the fashioning of new roles for the ICJ and, more broadly, for
international dispute settlement.
The prospects for constructive contributions to world order by the World Court
in this period of changing political geography are by no means dismal, as they
might have been several years ago in the wake of the Nicaragua judgment when
there was minimal Court activity and suggestions of permanent member disaf-
fection and resignation. In the intervening time both the conditions of the Court
and its milieu have changed dramatically. The Court's dockets are currently as
busy as they have ever been, 154 there is a widening area of legal topics being
addressed by the Court,1 55 a greater variety of states seeking recourse before the
Court, 156 and an impressive number of permanent member initiatives to enhance
153. In the wake of the Nicaragua case commentators questioned the appropriateness of the
Court's evidentiary findings in a number of areas. See Norton, supra note 145, at 479-83. On a
larger scale, that case highlights the burden of proof problems raised by disputes regarding armed
conflicts: with no compulsory process or contempt power, the Court possesses no authority to compel
evidence from unwilling third parties and doubts necessarily arise as to the veracity of evidence
introduced by the Parties. Since such issues are national security ones for the Parties and therefore
often require the provision of highly classified information, all the available evidence is usually not
given to the Court. Id.
154. See generally 1988-1989 I.C.J.Y.B.
155. In addition to boundary disputes (Burkina Faso v. Mali, 1987 I.C.J. 7, El Salvador v.
Honduras, 1987 I.C.J. 10, 15, 176 (chambers), Denmark v. Norway, 1988 I.C.J. 66, and Guinea-
Bissau v. Senegal, 1990 I.C.J. 64), which have been the subject at issue in a large number of ICJ
cases over the years, the Court will address aviation rights (Airbus Litigation-Iran v. U.S., 1989
I.C.J. 132), violations of the use of force (Nicaragua v. Honduras, 1988 I.C.J. 69), and state
responsibility for the environment (Nauru v. Australia, 1989 I.C.J. 12) in some of the cases before
it. Most recently it has also dealt with such issues as diplomatic rights and immunities (in the
Headquarters case, 1988 I.C.J. 12, and the Applicability of art. VI, sec. 22 case, 1988 I.C.J. 177
(advisory opinions)), international administrative law (in the Review of Judgment No. 333 of the
U.N. Administrative Tribunal, 1987 I.C.J. 18), and expropriation (U.S. v. Italy, 1989 I.C.J. 15).
156. In recent years a preponderant number of the parties (a ratio of 2:1) have been developing
countries.
VOL. 25, NO. 3
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 705
the role of the Court in the peaceful resolution of international disputes-all of
which augur well for its future.
While no international institution in this dynamic world system can remain
static, the Court does have its share of baggage having inhibitory influences with
which it and states must cope as its future unfolds. Courts are inherently con-
servative institutions, and the ICJ is no exception. There is little likelihood,
therefore, the basis for compulsory jurisdiction before the Court will change, or
that the Court will reverse its lenient policy regarding the acceptability of highly
restrictive reservations in article 36(2) declarations. Both are proscribed by the
Court's Statute and tradition. But as the winds of change blow, the Court may
become more flexible in areas more directly within its control and discretion, for
example, by modifying its Rules of Court to enlarge the usage and process
related to use of Chambers.
The institution of article 36(2), itself a compromise of the competing wills of
states, has not fulfilled its promise of inciting unenlisted states to join in a
multilateral compulsory jurisdiction regime. By measure of the number of states
that have declared their acceptances, or by the extent of restrictive reservations
contained in declarations of states that have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court, article 36(2) does not, and cannot, provide the backbone basis of
jurisdiction for the Court. While it still serves some purpose,' 57 it cannot be at
the core of U.S. policy toward the ICJ, and arguably, even with protective
reservations, would not serve the best interests of the United States.
B. BEYOND ARTICLE 36(2), TOwARD COMPULSORY JURISDICrION AND THE
CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
1. Strengthening the ICJ
The voluntary, consensual nature of ICJ jurisdiction generally, and of the
Court's jurisdiction under article 36(2) particularly, requires that states have con-
fidence in the competence and fairness of the Court, and that they are comfortable
with the adjudicative process offered by the Court given the nature and issues
raised by the dispute. However, compulsory jurisdiction, a means of guaranteeing
that disputes arising in a certain context will be subject to the jurisdiction of the
Court, does not mean that acceptance of article 36(2) is the only way it can be
157. The optional clause provides an important dispute settlement for much of the third world.
Professor Sohn has stated:
[Eiffective legal procedures for dispute settlement are especially important for small countries and for economi-
cally weak states. While the larger and mote powerful countries can apply extra-legal, political and economic
pressures, it is safer for smaller and weaker ones to have the dispute directed into legal channels where the principle
of equality before the law prevails.
Sohn, Settlement of Disputes Relating to the Interpretation and Application of Treaties, 150 ACA-
DEMIA DE DR. INT'L COLLEC' ED COURSES 205 (1976); see also N. Singh, supra note 21, at 254.
Arguably, this point is made by the number of recent article 36(2) acceptances by developing
countries, as well as by the number of cases currently or recently before the Court involving
developing nations as parties.
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achieved. To the contrary, compulsory jurisdiction merely refers to the situation
in which states have agreed that certain types of disputes in the future may be
referred to the Court without special agreement upon the application of one of
the parties. Thus, parties can achieve compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ in a
number of ways in addition to unilaterally declaring acceptance of article 36(2):
parties can achieve it by a compromissory clause in some previous agreement
on a particular topic in which states have agreed to submit disputes arising
thereunder to the ICJ;158 and by a general treaty among states on dispute
settlement.1 59 The latter two approaches offer a greater degree of advance
consent (and the concomitant likelihood of fewer contests over jurisdiction)
than does a unilateral declaration under article 36(2), which introduces the issue
of reciprocity' 6° to whether the Court may decide it has jurisdiction as well as
the possibility that a party will contest such jurisdiction, or defy the Court by its
nonappearance or noncompliance. 161
Given the recent interest in article 36(2) and the moral high ground achieved
by accepting this kind of jurisdiction of the ICJ, it is conceivable the United
States could devise a declaration with appropriate reservations and once again
accept this form of ICJ jurisdiction. But the problems described above leave a
nation like the United States, with its panoply of interests and responsibilities,
vulnerable to a number of problems, and it is always problematic whether all the
appropriate reservations protecting its vast interests and contingencies are capa-
ble of devisement. 162 Although article 36(2) will remain an optional approach for
achieving some form of compulsory jurisdiction for some time to come, its
nature and the consequences of acceptance are unlikely to attract major power
158. This is the most common way by which cases have come before the ICJ.
159. Early treaties of this nature called for inquiry and conciliation; later ones included arbitration
as an available method for resolving disputes. Since the 1920s such treaties have also specified
referral of disputes to an international court. Sometimes a distinction is made between legal and
nonlegal disputes, where legal disputes are referred to international courts and ones that require
nonlegal resolutions are referred to arbitration. Few international developments in this area have
occurred since World War II, but a number of regional organizations have developed such compulsory
jurisdiction regimes, namely the Organization of American States (Pact of Bogota) and the Council
of Europe. See supra note 48. See generally Sohn, supra note 3; JUDIcIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTER-
NATIONAL Dispums, supra note 63, at 81-130.
160. This means that a party accepts the jurisdiction of the Court in advance of a dispute, provided
that the other party in advance has also accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.
161. Nonappearance of the defendant has occurred at every stage of the following proceedings:
Fisheries Jurisdiction, Nuclear Tests, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, U.S. Diplomatic and Consular
Staff in Tehran. In some cases the nonappearance has occurred only during certain phases: Corfu
Channel (assessment of amount of compensation); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (interim protection); Not-
tebohm (preliminary objection); Nicaragua v. U.S. (merits and reparations). See 1988-1989 I.C.J.Y.B.
128 nn.3.
162. The United States, for example, could in a narrow article 36(2) acceptance of the Court's
jurisdiction, declare that it accepts ICJ jurisdiction regarding disputes arising under a certain treaty
or treaties. Declarations by a state can also include or exclude kinds of disputes which they consent
to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court such as those involving ongoing armed hostilities.
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acceptance unless such declarations contain substantial reservations. 163 How-
ever, smaller, developing countries will undoubtedly find article 36(2) accep-
tance more inviting, 164 and, with U.N. funding assistance for such litigation,
165
there could be an increased use of the ICJ by Third World countries. As new
nations emerge from under old alliances and participate in the building of a new
world order, for example the nations of eastern Europe and, perhaps, the Baltic
republics of the Soviet Union,' 66 prior acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction, in one
form or another, may be quite beneficial in providing a ready forum to resolve
disputes that might arise among them and other states.
1 67
Given the limitations of article 36(2) to provide a truly compulsory jurisdiction
basis for the Court, a better course for the United States is to exercise leadership in
building a dispute settlement network of compulsory jurisdiction reliant on a differ-
ent jurisdictional base, namely article 36(1). After all, it is more important to world
order under law that the ICJ be used by members of the world community, than that
any particular form of process be employed. The confidence in the Court demon-
strated by such commitments to submit disputes to the Court, and the reliance on
peaceful, legal resolution of disputes that is implied by a network of such commit-
ments is a significant statement advancing the rule of law in the world.168
The international community can best and most expeditiously achieve such a
network by having states refer disputes to the ICJ for resolution arising under
existing or future treaties-essentially, an article 36(1) approach. While the
United States can exercise leadership in developing this network of commit-
ments, it can not, even with a number of its closest allies, single-handedly reform
the institution or inspire the commitment of all states to it. It must respect the
practical politics of international consensus and lead by example to develop a
system of compulsory jurisdiction at least amongst its closest friends. 169 Such
U.S. leadership could be exercised in several progressive steps.
163. E.g., the Nauru v. Australia litigation, 1989 I.C.J. 12, brought under article 36(2) jurisdic-
tion, presents the prospect that other developing countries, which were former colonies of developed
countries, will file article 36(2) lawsuits claiming a breach of state responsibility regarding the
environment, if the developed country accepts article 36(2) jurisdiction without protective reserva-
tions. On the other hand, loading a declaration with substantial reservations loses for the declaring
state much of the moral high ground it might achieve by its acceptance.
164. See Sohn, supra note 82.
165. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
166. To these examples could be added the geopolitical changes of Central America, South
Africa, Korea.
167. Recently there were indications that Poland would declare its acceptance of article 36(2)
jurisdiction, although it has not yet done so. Three East Bloc countries (Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
and Poland) recently withdrew their reservations to ICJ clauses in certain multilateral treaties or have
indicated their intention to do so.
168. See generally T. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGriTMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).
169. In this context, it is appropriate to observe that states accept compromissory clauses pro-
viding for dispute settlement in treaties, especially for adjudication, to counteract various risks they
perceive in entering into the treaty. Professor Bilder has generally identified these risks as: the
possibility that a state may decide it no long wants to participate in a treaty regime; the risk that a
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First, the United States and its allies-particularly NATO members and "The
Seven," the largest industrial democracies that have been meeting annually at
economic summits 70-could enter into a treaty submitting to the ICJ (or to a
special chamber of the ICJ) any dispute between any two or more members
relating to the interpretation or application of any one of the international con-
ventions in an annex to the dispute settlement treaty and ratified by the parties to
the dispute.
Second, the permanent members of the Security Council could conclude a
treaty under which they would agree to submit to the ICJ (or to a special chamber
of the ICJ) any dispute between them relating to the interpretation or application
of international conventions that they both have ratified and that are listed in the
annex to the treaty. The expressed willingness of the Soviet Union to utilize the
ICJ signals new prospects for the use of the Court and possibly a new era of
major power involvement with the Court.
Third, the United States could further negotiate a series of treaties with various
states or groups of states accepting the jurisdiction of the ICJ with respect to
disputes arising under international agreements to which the disputants are par-
ties but which do not currently contain effective provisions for the settlement of
such disputes. An option to resort to special chambers at the initiative of any
party to a dispute could also be added.
Fourth, the President with the involvement of Congress could also put into
effect a recognition and enforcement system that would contribute to the effec-
tiveness of the dispute settlement system. Legislation providing that judgments
of the ICJ are recognized and enforceable by U.S. courts and not subject to a
state may find out in the future that benefits of the agreement are outweighed by its costs; and the risk
that the parties may not perform as promised. R. BiLDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENT 14-15 (1981). To these considerations, one might add that states seek the accomplish-
ment of at least one of the following goals when they agree to a compromissory clause: that the
parties may want to provide for an authoritative settlement of disputes that arise concerning imple-
mentation of the treaty; that the parties may want to provide a mechanism for the adjustment of treaty
obligations to overcome what may be harsh effects of a strict application of the treaty requirements;
that the parties believe provision for formal adjudication will promote the stability of treaty norms
reflective of their intentions and deter breach; and/or that the parties feel interstate adjudication
strengthens and contributes to the development of customary and conventional international law. See
Noyes, Compulsory Third-Parry Adjudication and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L. 675, 677-87 (1989). Thus, when devising a U.S. strategy to enlarge
the compulsory jurisdiction via the compromissory clause vehicle, one ought to assess the extent to
which these goals are present.
170. The Seven are actually composed of eight participants: the Heads of State of the United
States, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Canada, and the Head
of the European Commission. The Group of Seven, or G-7 as it is also known, should not be
confused with these seven, although representatives of many of the same countries are included.
"The G-7 . . .has 15 members-the finance ministers and the central-bank chieftains of those same
seven countries [as The Seven], plus the head of the International Monetary Fund." Wall St. J.,
July 9, 1990, at R9, col. 2.
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defense of sovereign immunity could be passed; furthermore, the United States
could initiate by treaty the establishment of an international network for the
recognition and enforcement of ICJ judgments, much like the 1958 New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
17 1
established for international arbitration.
Finally, in its effort to build a compulsory jurisdiction network for the ICJ, the
United States should use its diplomatic influence to persuade the states involved
in the current restructuring of the world system to build dispute-settlement
mechanisms into their emerging interstate relationships, and, to the extent pos-
sible, to rely on ICJ processes for resolving disputes.
2. The Structural Evolution of
International Dispute Settlement
On a broader scale, embracing other processes than adjudication, there could
be greater availability of processes and fora for the resolution of international
disputes. As the nature of international disputes threatening to world order
evolves, the institutional structures provided to respond must also evolve. Many
disputes previously considered interstate and addressed by the politically con-
tentious system of diplomatic protection, today can be recognized as essentially
private disputes and subject to the myriad of dispute resolution processes and
institutions capable of administering them that are being developed by the private
sector. 172 This would also have the effect of defusing the political content of what
might otherwise be treated as interstate concerns.
The technicalities presented by recent areas of interstate controversies, such as
environmental pollution, trade, intellectual property protection, and even some
kinds of criminal conduct, 17 3 suggest that new tribunals possessing special ex-
171. Done June 10, 1952, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; (adopted by the
United States Dec. 29, 1970).
172. The evolution from diplomatic protection to international commercial arbitration and to institutions such as the
[Iran-U.S. Claims] Tribunal and ICSID is in the international community's interest. The trend away from classic
interstate arbitration is desirable politically because it reduces the significance of the state as a world actor in areas
where the sensitivities of the state need not be implicated.
Caron, supra note 141, at 155.
173. Much criticism has been made of the United States Government's assertions of its extrater-
ritorial criminal jurisdiction. The claim that U.S. authorities may seize and try citizens of other
nations for acts committed outside the United States underlies the criminal prosecution of former
heads of state, namely Former Presidents Marcos and Noriega of the Philippines and Panama,
respectively.
"Midway through the trial of Imelda Marcos and Adnan M. Khashoggi, U.S. District Judge
John K. Keenan asked what turned out to be the decisive question: 'What am I doing here [in a New
York City courtroom] trying a case involving the theft of money from Philippine banks?' " Dick
Tracy Doctrine, L.A. Times, July 4, 1990, at B6, col. 6.
Former heads of state pose unique issues, but this concern has also arisen in other contexts such
as in the litigation surrounding the Bhopal catastrophe. See generally TRANSFERmG HAZARDOUS
ThCHNOLOGIES AND SUBSTANCES: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CHALLENGE (G. Handl & R. Lutz ed.
1989).
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pertise may be needed. 174 The ICJ may possess the capacity, for example by way
of a special chambers procedure, to provide such expertise, or it may be nec-
essary to build new institutions within the Court or without it to offer adequate
fora. Such issues also pose the possibility that the process of adjudication may
not optimize resolution possibilities. 1 75 Other processes, including conciliation,
good offices, inquiry, negotiation, and arbitration, should be available to states
and might be appropriately housed at the ICJ. 176
The functioning of the international system today relies upon entities in addition
to states, and these play increasingly important roles in the maintenance of world
order. In particular, international organizations and national courts contribute sig-
nificantly to that order. Thus, in building a structure capable of responding to the
dispute resolution needs of the international community, both international organi-
zations and national courts need access to the ICJ. Broadening the jurisdiction of the
Court to include these entities would be a realistic response and add a dimension of
activity bound to enhance the rule of law. 177 International organizations could be
given standing either to seek advisory opinions of the ICJ, or to instigate nonad-
versarial dispute resolution processes such as inquiry or mediation that might be
provided under the auspices of the 10. National courts, as authorized under national
law, could seek the advisory opinion of the ICJ with respect to questions involving
important issues of international law. 178
3. Springtime of Nations and World Order
The changing world political condition demands astute assessments about the
structures needed by states and other important entities to resolve disputes threat-
ening to public order. With cold war security arrangements in flux and economic
relationships being modified, 179 some of the institutions that in the past enabled
states to resolve differences by political means may not provide the same op-
174. See generally B. FERENz, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A STm TOWARD WORLD
PEACE (1980) (suggesting a criminal court); N. SINGH, supra note 21, 164-66 (proposing a dispute
settlement mechanism for environmental disputes); Bello & Holmer, Settling Disputes in the GAIT:
The Past, Present, and Future, 24 INT'L LAW. 519 (1990) (indicating need for improving GATr's
dispute settlement system).
175. See Sohn, The Future of Dispute Settlement, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 1121, 1134 (R. Macdonald & D. Johnston, ed. 1983).
176. See generally Draft General Treaty, supra note 19.
177. In a speech delivered by Former President Jimmy Carter at the meeting of the Organization
for African Unity in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on July 10, 1990, he indicated there were eight
regional conflicts in Africa today, more than any other continent. He noted that the international
community is without many tools in trying to resolve such conflicts; in particular, he emphasized that
international organizations are frustrated in their attempts because of their inability to mediate with
hostile groups. See generally Joint Hearing of the Africa Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee and the International Task Force of the House Select Hunger Committee (Feb. 28, 1990)
reprinted in Federal News Service, Feb. 28, 1990.
178. See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.
179. See Tarnoff, America's New Special Relationships, 69 FOREIGN AFF. 67 (1990).
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portunities in the near future. New institutions will be needed, some of which
will be built upon the solid foundations of older ones.' 
80
The International Court of Justice is just that sort of institution-both a sym-
bol of the rule of law and a facility capable of a greater role. By improving the
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ primarily by compromissory clauses in trea-
ties as prescribed above, the United States can contribute to building a consen-
sual network of states willing to submit disputes to the Court voluntarily. An
expanded group of states accepting the jurisdiction of the Court in this way
strengthens this valuable symbol of world order and is, at this propitious time in
history, a significant affirmation of the rule of law. 181 Other institutional modi-
fications are warranted by the changing international system, and initiatives,
such as those mentioned above, could be appropriately launched during the next
ten years, which the United Nations has denominated the "decade of interna-
tional law." '
8 2
For the United States, whose initial post-Nicaragua-case ambivalence towards
the ICJ limited both its willingness and capacity to contribute constructively to
enhancing the Court's jurisdiction, this strategy marks a sound and positive
course and builds upon its recent willingness to participate in cases before the
Court. It also rekindles the idea, if not the image, of a universal compulsory
jurisdiction, which the founders of the PCIJ had years before. Although realistic
assessment of the Court's history tends to dampen U.S. enthusiasm for such an
ideal under article 36(2) in this period of nationalistic fervor,' 8 3 the value of a
form of compulsory jurisdiction before institutions like the ICJ, which represents
the commitment of states to resolve at least certain of their international disputes
by international tribunal according to international law, is appealing and should
be promoted. Only when nations are totally committed to the peaceful settlement
of disputes will the post-Second World War determination to "save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war, which ... has brought untold sorrow to
mankind" 184 be realized. Then, too, the "conditions under which justice and
respect for the obligations arising from . . . international law can be main-
tained."18 5
180. See, e.g., CSCE Valletta Report, supra note 62.
181. Such a network of commitments under various treaties to submit interstate disputes to the ICJ
places greater reliance on the use of treaties.
182. 44 GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/44/191, 27 July 1989. The Annex to the declaration specifies that:
The work of the decade of international law would emphasize, inter aia, the following:
(a) The promotion and enhancement of peaceful methods for the settlement of disputes between states,
including resort to the International Court of Justice and compliance with its judgments;...
(e) Preparations for and commencing of a third peace conference at the conclusion of the decade of interna-
tional law, which would consider and adopt appropriate international instruments for the enhancement of
international law and the strengthening of methods for the peaceful settlement of international disputes,
including the role of the International Court of Justice.
183. See Howard, The Springtime of Nations, 69 FOREIGN APP. 17 (1990).
184. U.N. CHAtmR Introductory Declaration.
185. Id.
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